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ARTICLES
RABBIS AND OTHER TOP HATS:
THE GREAT ESCAPE
Ridgeley A. Scott*
The first "Rabbi trust" was developed by a congregation that wanted to
provide for its Rabbi after his retirement. The arrangement consisted of
a pension plan1 and an accompanying trust.2 Trust assets remained sub-
ject to claims of the congregation's creditors, and the Rabbi had a vested
interest in the trust.3 The Rabbi could not withdraw money from the
trust until his retirement or other termination of service.' A favorable
letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)5 for this arrange-
ment encouraged others to ask for rulings. Rabbi trusts are currently in
great demand because many consider them to be the best available choice
for deferred compensation plans.
The two types of deferred compensation plans are qualified and non-
qualified. Both types permit employees and independent contractors to
elect to postpone taxation of a portion of their compensation.7 The prin-
cipal advantages of qualified plans are that the employer may deduct con-
tributions8 when the contributions are paid to the trust,9 and earnings of
* Professor of Law, Widener University. The author wishes to thank Ms. Rosemary
Crosley, his secretary, and Ms. Mary Jane Mallonee, of the Widener Law Library, for their
tireless efforts and cooperation on this project.
1. A pension or profit-sharing plan is qualified for special tax treatment if it satisfies
several statutory requirements. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Any plan which
does not satisfy all of the requirements is nonqualified. E.g., Ludden v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 826, 829-33 (1977), affd, 620 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1980).




6. Supra note 1.
7. I.R.C. § 402(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Deferral can also be accomplished with a cash or
deferred plan, or an individual retirement account. Id. §§ 219(a) (1988), 401(k) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. §§ 404(a)(1)-(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
9. Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); see Commissioner v.
Keystone Consol. Indus., 113 S. Ct. 2006 (1993).
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trust assets are exempt from taxation.1" However, qualified plans are the
most expensive type of arrangement because the advantages are more
than offset by the cost of qualification.
This Article explores the requirements for creation of a successful
Rabbi trust. Part I outlines the general effects and requirements of quali-
fied plans, nonqualified plans without a trust, nonqualified plans with a
secular trust, and nonqualified plans with a Rabbi trust. Part II discusses
ways to avoid application of the labor portion of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA). Part III summarizes the tax re-
quirements for establishment of a nonqualified plan and Rabbi trust,
while parts IV through VI contain detailed consideration of income
deferral methods. Part VII covers the treatment of Rabbi trusts operated
by governments and exempt organizations. In part VIII the Article con-
cludes that legislation is required to settle the numerous uncertainties as-
sociated with the Rabbi trust, and recommends interim measures that can
provide predictability.
I. GENERAL COMPARISONS AND REQUIREMENTS
In the case of a qualified plan, the employer gets a deduction when he
makes a contribution,1' the trust is not taxed on its earnings,12 and
participants are not taxed until actual receipt of benefits.13 The opposite
extreme is a nonqualified plan, where the employer retains possession of
the assets. Income from the assets is taxed to the employer, the em-
ployer gets a deduction when benefits are taxed to participants,' 4 and
participants are taxed at the earlier of actual or constructive receipt of
benefits.'
5
Secular is the term which describes most trusts used in connection with
nonqualified plans. With the secular trust, the employer is entitled to an
expense deduction when vesting occurs, 6 income is taxed to the trust,'7
and participants are taxed when vesting occurs.' 8 Rabbi is the description
for a trust used in connection with a nonqualified plan if trust assets re-
main subject to claims of creditors of the employer. Under the Rabbi
Trust, the employer is entitled to an expense deduction when benefits are
10. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988).
11. Id. §§ 404(a)(1)-(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
12. Id. § 501(a) (1988).
13. Id. § 402(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
14. Id. §§ 83(h), 404(a)(5) (1988).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
16. I.R.C. §§ 83(h), 404(a)(5).
17. Id. § 641(a).
18. Id. § 402(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
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taxed to the participants, 19 income of the trust is taxed to the employer,20
and participants are taxed at the earlier of actual or constructive receipt
of benefits.2'
Suppose a participant is hired by an employer at age forty-five and his
interest will vest at age fifty. Normal retirement age is sixty-five, and no
withdrawals from the plan are permitted prior to that time. The em-
ployer begins contributing money to the plan for the participant's account
when he reaches age forty-seven. Typical results are set forth in tabular
form, where numerical answers identify timing in terms of the partici-
pant's age:
Type of Plan Qualified No Trust Secular Rabbi
Contribution No Tax No Tax No Tax No Tax
Deduction 47 65+ 50 65+
Earnings of No Tax Taxed to Taxed to Taxed to
Assets Employer Employer Employer
Benefit 65+ 65+ 50 65+
A. Qualified Plans
While qualified plans are the most attractive option from a tax perspec-
tive, mechanical and subjective criteria are used to determine whether
there is excess discrimination in coverage or benefits that would deny
qualification.1 The result is that some rank and file employees who
would not have been covered will participate, 2a and participants will be
entitled to greater benefits. Since they are the most expensive type to
operate and there is no advantage to an employer, a qualified plan should
not be adopted unless it is required by a labor agreement.
B. Nonqualified, No Trust Plans
If the employer is unwilling to bear the cost of qualification,2 4 other
types of plans should be considered. One possibility is a nonqualified
plan without a trust.' While such plans receive less favorable tax treat-
ment, 6 they are also the least expensive for the employer to operate. If
19. Id. §§ 83(h), 404(a)(5) (1988).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.677-(b)l(d) (1971), 1.671-3(a)(1) (1969).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
22. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b), 416.
23. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-58, 1983-1 C.B. 95, distinguished, Rev. Rul. 84-150, 1984-2
C.B. 99.
24. See supra note 1.
25. E.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
26. Supra text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
the labor provisions of ERISA do not apply,27 there are no participants
or benefits other than ones the employer wants to pay for, and there are
no costs associated with operating a trust. Participants, however, have
reason to be concerned about whether they will be able to collect benefits
earned under the no trust plan. Assets in the hands of the employer re-
main subject to claims of the employer's creditors, and the employer is
free to dispose of the assets if he chooses to do so.
C. Secular Plans
A nonqualified plan with a secular trust' is another possibility. Since
assets are placed in a trust not subject to the claims of the employer's
creditors, they are protected from the risks of business, and payments
cannot be withheld on the whim of management.29 Another advantage is
that the discrimination rules3 ° do not apply. The disadvantages are that
secular plans receive the least favorable tax treatment, 31 and they are re-
quired to comply with various rules in the labor portion of ERISA.
These rules involve the adequacy of things such as participation,32 vest-
ing,33 accrual of benefits, 34 funding,
35 and fiduciary responsibility.36
D. Rabbi Trust
The final choice is a nonqualified plan with a Rabbi trust. While trust
assets remain subject to the claims of the employer's creditors, the terms
of the trust can prevent the employer from disposing of the assets.
37
Rabbi trusts receive the same tax treatment as nonqualified plans without
a trust,38 and the plan can be set up so the labor portion of ERISA does
not apply.39 Hence the employer's expenses are limited to those it wants
to incur.40 Many employers think that the Rabbi trust option is the best
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1) (1988).
28. Secular is the name for trusts that are not Rabbi because assets are not subject to
claims of the employer's creditors.
29. Instead of being taxed to the employer, trust income is taxed to the trust. I.R.C.
§ 641(a) (1988).
30. Id. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b), 416.
31. Supra text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
33. Id. § 1053.
34. Id. § 1054.
35. Id. § 1082.
36. Id. § 1104.
37. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
38. Supra text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
39. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991), 1081(a)(3) (1988),
1101(a)(I).
40. Id.; see also id. §§ 1052-1054, 1104 (1988 & Supp. I1I11991).
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compromise of tax attributes, operating expenses, coverage, and protec-
tion.41 Despite their appeal, a number of uncertainties exist with respect
to Rabbi trusts.
1. Top Hat Exemption
One uncertainty is whether the plan will be exempt from the labor por-
tion of ERISA. Since application of the statute would result in a substan-
tial increase in the cost of either a nonqualified plan without a trust or a
Rabbi trust,42 these plans can be effective only if they satisfy the require-
ments for the top hat exemption. 43
The requirements for the top hat exemption are uncertain. 4 A plan
must be "unfunded," which means that benefits will be paid directly from
assets of the employer.45 The IRS has concluded that a plan with a Rabbi
trust is unfunded because trust assets remain subject to claims of the em-
ployer's creditors.46 The Department of Labor (Labor) has indicated it
will follow the IRS's funding criteria.47 Hence, if the IRS determines that
a trust satisfies Rabbi criterion, the plan apparently will be unfunded for
top hat purposes.
Another top hat requirement is that the participants must be a select
group. The select group criterion is unclear. Labor believes the plan may
not include any individual who is not management or highly compen-
41. See, e.g., Ronald Fink, Trust Worth, FiN. WoRLD, Feb. 18, 1992, at 66; Elizabeth
Karier, Most Firms Fund Executive Plans, PENSIONS & INvEs VENTs, Mar. 30, 1992, at 8;
William E. Lissy, To Encourage Executive Stock Ownership: Companies Use Guidelines or
Targets, COMPENSA7ON & BENEFrs Rnv., July 1992, at 12.
42. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1054.
43. The top hat exemption applies to unfunded plans where participation is limited to
a select group of management and highly compensated employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2),
1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1) (1988).
44. Release of draft Rabbi trust regulations has been repeatedly postponed, and Labor
has not provided any useful guidelines. Hence, many employers have been unable to make
reasonable advance determinations about whether a proposed plan is likely to be
approved.
45. Compare Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (8th Cir.)
(holding that a plan will be deemed funded when an employee may rely upon a res sepa-
rate from the ordinary asset of the employer in the event that the liability of the plan is
triggered), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981) with Belsky v.
First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that no separate res exists
from the ordinary assets of the employer when an employer reserves the right to treat the
assets of a plan as unpledged and unrestricted).
46. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
47. Letter from Elliot I. Daniel, Assistant Adm'r for Regs. & Interpretations, Office of
Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Richard H. Manfreda, Chief,
Individual Income Tax Branch, IRS (Dec. 13, 1985) (on file with the Catholic University
Law Review) [hereinafter Daniel Letter].
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sated.18 Further, Labor finds a group including all of the employer's
management and highly compensated employees to not be select.49
There is no reasonably clear indication of how exclusive the group must
be in order to qualify as select.
2. Postponement of Income
For tax purposes, a plan is considered adequate if it postpones receipt
of compensation, 0 and trust assets remain subject to the claims of the
employer's creditors."1 The IRS will not issue a favorable ruling on a
trust unless the trust satisfies the model Rabbi trust requirements
promulgated in a 1992 revenue procedure.5 2
The form of the employer's obligation to pay benefits is important.
Obligations paid in cash or tangible property are usually income to the
payee, while payments of intangible property are less likely to be income
when received.53 Since the goal of all pension and profit sharing plans is
to delay realization of income until the participants receive cash, the criti-
cal question is whether the promise to pay is adequate to avoid taxation
at the time the promise is received.54
The principal criterion for determining whether the receipt of a prom-
ise is income is the likelihood of payment.-5  The receipt is not income if
substantial doubt exists as to whether the employee will be able to con-
vert the promise to cash. 6 For the purpose of making judgments about
the probability of payment, there are three classes of promises.5 7 One
class of promises is those secured by assets of the employer that have
been placed beyond the reach of the employer's creditors.58 Another
48. Compare Dep't of Labor (DOL) Advisory Op. 75-64 (Aug. 1, 1975) (finding ex-
emption for plan covering less than 4% of employees whose annual compensation aver-
aged $28,000 compared to $19,000 for other managerial employees) with DOL Advisory
Op. 85-37 A (Oct. 25, 1985) (finding no exemption for a plan covering six officers and
directors as well as thirty-three other participants whose annual salaries ranged from
$12,121 to $45,000).
49. DOL Advisory Op. 85-37A (May 8, 1990).
50. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422; Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
51. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422, 424.
52. Id. at 423.
53. See, eg., STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAx Accoumo I 3.03(1)(c) (1988)
(discussing the timing differences in recognition of taxable income for intangible property).
54. E.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
55. E.g., 4 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAxAIoN OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND Gvr's 105-49 (2d ed. 1992).
56. See Louis H. Diamond & Mitchell S. Cutler, Promissory Notes for Services: When
Are they Taxable to a Cash Basis Taxpayer?, 26 J. TAx'N 66, 67-68 (1967).
57. Id.
58. I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 403(c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1985).
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class is promises with a sufficient degree of liquidity in the marketplace.5 9
The third class is promises that provide a right of possession which puts
the participant in constructive receipt of income."
II. ERISA COVERAGE
A. Absence of a Plan
ERISA can be subdivided into labor 6 and tax62 provisions. The labor
provisions generally apply to all deferred compensation plans.63 The tax
provisions apply mainly to pension and profit-sharing plans seeking quali-
fied status.' Legislative and administrative materials do not offer a gen-
eral definition for the term "plan," and authorities suggest that the
principal question is whether an arrangement was intended to benefit
members of a group.
65
Two categories of factors are used to decide whether a plan exists.
66
The first is whether the parties treat the arrangement as benefitting a
group of people.67 One article concluded that no plan exists if the de-
ferred compensation is under a contract negotiated between the em-
ployer and one employee.68 Similarly, no plan exists if promises
contained in several individual employment contracts are isolated
events.69 Promises in contracts to multiple individuals, however, may be
59. Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56.
60. *Teas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
61. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), §§ 1-514, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1145 (1988 & Supp. 11I 1991).
62. I.R.C. §§ 401-418E (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1017, 2001-2008.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2)-(3), 1003(a) (1988).
64. I.R.C. § 401(a).
65. See, e.g., Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan. 1988), amended,
No. 85-2639-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2344 (D. Kan. Feb. 23,1989); DOL Advisory Op. 76-
111 (Sept. 28, 1976).
66. Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at 204.
67. Id. at 205.
68. Randolph M. Goodman & Laura E. Stone, Exempt Compensation Arrangements
Under ERISA, 28 CATm. U. L. REv. 445, 452-53 (1979).
69. Jervis v. Elerding, 504 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1980). For instance, no plan would
exist if an employer offered deferred compensation to attract new employees pursuant to a
decision to expand into new markets. In a 1988 case, such promises were included in the
employment contracts individually negotiated between the employer and four prospective
employees. Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at 201. The court, relying on the Office of Pension and
Welfare Benefit Program's definition of a plan, concluded that no plan existed because
these agreements were merely individual employment contracts, and therefore did not fall
within the definition of a plan under ERISA. Id. The Department of Labor has reached
the same result in similar circumstances. E.g., DOL Advisory Op. 76-111 (Sept. 28, 1976);
DOL Advisory Op. 76-79 (May 25, 1976).
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evidence of a plan.7" The key issue is how many promises are needed to
establish a pattern sufficient to constitute a plan. There would pre-
sumably be no doubt that a plan existed if a promise was in every em-
ployment contract made by an employer; however, there is no standard
for determining the exact number of individual promises that would be
necessary.7'
The second category of factors evaluates compliance with ERISA re-
quirements. An arrangement that fails to create documents, hold assets
in trust, and identify fiduciaries probably will not be considered a plan.
72
Mass failure is evidence of a lack of intent to benefit the members of a
group.73
If the arrangement is not a plan, ERISA does not apply.74 If the ar-
rangement does constitute a plan, ERISA applies unless an exemption is
available. The exemption for unfunded excess benefit plans is limited to
programs that provide benefits in excess of those that can be paid by
qualified plans." This top hat exemption is available to unfunded plans
for management and highly compensated employees.
76
B. Top Hat
A top hat plan is "unfunded... and maintained by the employer pri-
marily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select
group of management or highly compensated employees." 77 Since the
participants usually have the ability to substantially influence the opera-
tion of the plan, they do not need the protection otherwise provided
under ERISA.78 Some question remains as to the specific requirements
of the top hat exemption.
There must be an adequate group, which means that all or most of the
participants are management or highly compensated employees.79 Labor
70. See, e.g., McQueen v. Salida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 n.1
(D. Colo. 1987) (implying that contractual promises to multiple employees may reveal the
existence of a plan).
71. Callihan v. Brickford Equip. Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1424, 1429-30 (M.D. Ala. 1990);
Purser v. Euron Corp., 10 E.B.C. 1561 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988); Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at 205.
73. See Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at 205.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b).
75. Id. § 1003(b)(5).
76. Id. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1).
77. Id. § 1051(2).
78. Id.; DOL Advisory Op. 90-14A (May 8, 1990).
79. For example, where a select group of participants accounted for less than 4% of
the employer's active work force, and their average annual salary of $28,000 was $9000
above the average of managerial employees, the group was held to qualify under the top
hat exemption. DOL Advisory Op. 75-64 (August 1, 1975). On the other hand, a group of
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believes coverage cannot be made available to anyone who is not man-
agement or highly compensated. 0 An adequate group must be select,
which means that a group cannot cover all management and highly com-
pensated employees. An employer may have several top hat plans.
8'
One approach is to have a number of programs offering different types of
benefits to various groups. One group might consist of those desiring life
coverage, while another may select profit-sharing. Since there is a ra-
tional ground for distinguishing between the groups, each would appear
to be select, even if all management and highly compensated employees
receive one sort of benefit or another. 2
The plan must be unfunded.83 Legislative materials do not suggest an
approach to the funding issue, and courts have dealt with the question
simply by examining the details of each particular plan.' Labor takes the
position that decisions are to be based on an examination of the facts and
circumstances including the status of the plan under non-ERISA law.
85
Labor feels that tax rulings should be given significant weight, and thus
concludes that a plan would not fail to qualify under the top hat exemp-
tion because it includes a Rabbi trust.8 6 Labor apparently will continue
to follow the IRS approach that treats a plan as unfunded so long as the
assets remain subject to claims of the employer's creditors.8
7
executives that included a comptroller, an accountant, three foremen, a scheduler, and a
time study position, was found to be inadequate. DOL Advisory Op. 85-37A (Oct. 25,
1985).
80. DOL Advisory Op. 80-14A (May 8, 1990).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (1992).
82. See DOL Advisory Op. 75-64 (Aug. 1, 1975).
83. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(holding a plan to be funded where benefits are provided exclusively through insurance),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, and cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
84. See id. One plan provided that the employer's obligation was to be secured by
purchasing life insurance, and did not give the employer the right to treat the policy as a
general and unrestricted asset of the employer. Id. The court concluded that the plan was
funded. Id. at 1208. The decision was distinguished by the same circuit in a later case
where an employer purchased a separate life insurance policy for each key executive. Bel-
sky v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987). Under the plan, the employer
was not obligated to buy insurance, and if it in fact did so, it was not to be held in trust or
as security. Id. at 663. The court construed the plan as unfunded because the rights of
participants were merely those of unsecured creditors. Id.
85. Proposed Labor Reg. § 2550.401b-1 (Aug. 22, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 50,366 (1979),
revised 45 Fed. Reg. 38,086 (1980), modified and finalized, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,247 (1982), 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-101 (1992); see DOL Advisory Op. 81-11 A (Jan. 15, 1981).
86. Daniel Letter, supra note 47.
87. DOL Advisory Op. 92-13 A (May 19, 1992).
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If the top hat exemption applies, the plan is exempt from ERISA's
participation, vesting, funding, and fiduciary responsibility rules.88 The
exemption does not extend to the reporting and disclosure provisions.
89
Those requirements are satisfied if the plan administrator files a state-
ment giving the name, address, and tax identification number of the em-
ployer, the number of top hat plans set up, the number of employees in
each, and by furnishing documents when requested by Labor.
90
An advisory opinion is recommended as the best insurance against a
change of heart in the qualification for a top hat exemption. 91 Labor
would be reluctant to claim that a plan did not satisfy the top hat criterion
if it had issued an opinion reaching the opposite conclusion.'
III. TAX REQUIREMENTs
In order to serve its purpose, the plan must postpone taxation to the
participants, and assets of the Rabbi trust must remain subject to claims
of the employer's creditors.93
A. Funding
There are three approaches to funding. The first approach, permitting
the employer to remain in possession of plan assets,94 has the advantages
of simplicity and lower cost.95 On the other hand, unrestricted access
makes it easy for the employer to dispose of the assets.96 Another prob-
lem of this approach is that the employer might refuse to pay. While
current management may be friendly and cooperative, there is no way of
knowing what the attitude may be in subsequent years.
The second approach is to place plan assets in a Rabbi trusty' If the
plan uses a Rabbi trust, a favorable letter will not be issued on the plan
unless the trust follows model language98 and complies with the other
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1) (1988).
89. Id. §§ 1021-1031 (1988 & Supp. 1H 1991). Administration and enforcement rules
also continue to apply. Id. §9 1132-1145.
90. Alternative Method of Compliance for Pension Plans for Certain Selected Em-
ployees, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (1992).
91. ERISA Proc. 76-1, § 10 (Aug. 24, 1976), reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 36,283 (1976).
92. See, e.g., Boggs v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1166, 1171 (4th Cir. 1986); Lawsons,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 733, 786-87 (1978), affd on retroactive revocation issue, 622
F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980).
93. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422, 425.
94. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. This approach is available only if the
arrangement is not a plan, or an exemption is available. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
95. For example, saving the time and cost involved in dealing with the trust.
96. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
97. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
98. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
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model trust requirements.99 Since assets of the trust must remain subject
to claims of the employer's creditors, the trust is unfunded for tax pur-
poses. The trust cannot cause the plan to be funded under the labor por-
tion of ERISA.1°° The trustee must be an independent third party, such
as a bank.10 1 The trustee must be given some investment discretion, such
as authority to invest within broad guidelines." z
Plan participants may be given the right to select assets in which their
accounts will be deemed invested.' 0 3 The value of those assets is used to
measure benefits eventually payable."°4 While the trustee may be per-
mitted to actually purchase those assets, he cannot be required to do
so.
10 5
While assets of the Rabbi trust must be subject to claims of the em-
ployer's creditors, access may be denied unless the employer has become
insolvent.' 6 The board of directors and chief executive officer must have
an express duty to notify the trustee if the employer becomes insolvent.
Upon receipt of notice, the trustee must be obligated to suspend pay-
ments to all beneficiaries, and to hold all trust assets for the benefit of
creditors. The obligation to pay general creditors must be enforceable
under federal and state law, and beneficiaries must be treated as un-
secured creditors of the employer. 107 A spendthrift provision must pro-
hibit transfers by beneficiaries.' 0 8
Since a Rabbi trust is a grantor trust, the trust is treated for tax pur-
poses as if it did not exist.'0 9 Hence, trust income, deductions, and credits
99. Id. at 423.
100. Id.; Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-30-012 (April 24, 1992);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-04-046 (Oct. 30, 1991).
101. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422, 423. See generally GEORGE G. BOGERT &
GEORGE T. BOGERT, Tim LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 131, 134-36 (rev. 2d ed.
1984); AusTn' W. ScoTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THm LAW OF TRUSTS § 96.5 (4th ed.
1987).
102. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422,423. One letter concludes that investments may
be limited to stock of the employer where the trustee was given traditional investment
powers, including the right to vote the stock and the right to purchase and sell stock on the
open market. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-35-006 (Dec. 4, 1991); DOL Advisory Op. 92-13 A (May
19, 1992).
103. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-34-015 (May 25, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-04-023 (Oct.
30, 1987).
104. Id.
105. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-11-022 (Dec. 8, 1983).
106. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422, 425; Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
107. Id
108. For example, an interest in the trust cannot be given away or used as security for a
loan, nor can it be subject to legal process brought against the beneficiary such as attach-
ment or garnishment. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
109. Id.; Rev. Rul. 70-567,1970-2 C.B. 133; Rev. Rul. 68-47,1968-1 C.B. 300. See gener-
ally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 101, § 19; Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 101, § 12.1.
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are to be reported by the employer on its tax return, 10 and the trustee is
not required to file a fiduciary income tax return for the trust."'
The third approach is for the assets to be held by a fund." 2 The differ-
ence between a fund and a trust is that trustees have broad management
powers while the authority of fund custodians is limited." 3 Since the as-
sets are not held in trust, there is no need to file a fiduciary income tax
return." 4 The assets and earnings are considered property of the em-
ployer, with income from the trust included in its return."1
5
Although a fund is not a trust for tax purposes, it probably will be
treated as a trust under state law." 6 Hence a custodian who fails to pay
benefits without apparent justification may be ordered to fulfill his obli-
gations.11 7 Custodians also may be held personally liable for damages." 8
The advantage of the fund approach is that the Rabbi trust restrictions
do not apply.119 For example, the governing document is not required to
follow the model trust requirements. 20 Since the fiduciary does not have
to be a qualified individual, the employer could hold that office.121 The
fund can be required to acquire assets selected by participants,"2 and
plan assets do not have to be subject to the claims of the employer's cred-
itors unless the plan would be funded for top hat purposes. A spendthrift
provision is not required under the fund approach.
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(d) (as amended 1977); id. § 1.671-3(a)(1) (as amended
1969); id. § 1.61-13(b) (1960).
111. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-30-012 (Apr. 24, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-04-046 (Oct. 30,
1991).
112. Rev. Rul. 69-300, 1969-1 C.B. 167.
113. Id. For example, one private letter ruling concerned a bank that was required to
make investments pursuant to written directions from the employer, and was not responsi-
ble for any investment decisions relating to the fund. IRS observed that the duties of the
bank were limited, and concluded that the arrangement was a fund rather than a trust
because the bank had limited duties. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-37-018 (June 15, 1990) (holding that
the bank was not a trust); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-061 (Jan. 23, 1990) (same).
114. Rev. Rul. 70-567, 1970-2 C.B. 133; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-37-018 (June 15, 1990).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-13(b) (1960); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-37-018 (June 15, 1990).
116. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 101, §§ 471-72; ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note
101, § 462.1.
117. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 101, § 861; ScOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 101,
§ 199.1.
118. Id.
119. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
120. Id.
121. In general, anyone may be a trustee. An employer may be the trustee of a plan for
his employees. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
122. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-34-015 (May 25, 1988).
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B. Plans
Deferred compensation arrangements may be established pursuant to
an individual employment contract123 or a plan.124 Participants may be
employees, self-employed, directors, partners, or shareholders."2 Since
there are no discrimination rules, coverage can be extended to any group
of individuals that suits the employer or individual maintaining the
plan.126 However, an advance ruling does not apply to a controlling
shareholder.
127
The principal goal is to postpone receipt of compensation until cash
payments are due.' 28 Whether receipt will be deferred depends upon ap-
plication of general income timing rules.'29 Under these rules, the ques-
tions are whether there was an actua 1 30 or constructive1 3 ' receipt of a
taxable property interest1 32 before cash payments are due.
A promise to pay money may be a taxable property interest, which is
considered income upon receipt. 133 Receipt of a promise is taxable if the
note or other indebtedness can readily be converted into cash.'3 Con-
structive receipt occurs if an individual with a right to possession of a
taxable property interest has not obtained actual possession due to his
failure to exercise the right of possession.131 If receipt did not occur at an
earlier time, tax is imposed at the time of actual receipt of benefits.
136
123. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; DOL Advisory Op. 76-79 (May 25,
1976).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988); e.g., Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan.
1988) (holding deferred compensation provisions in individual contracts were not plans);
Goodman & Stone, supra note 68, at 452-53.
125. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
126. Discrimination rules are a factor only if the plan seeks qualification. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1988). Participation and other rules of the labor portion of ERISA do
not apply to promises in individual contracts, or top hat plans. See Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at
201 (holding that the existence of a plan "is a prerequisite to jurisdiction under ERISA");
see also 29 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2).
127. Rev. Proc. 93-3, 1993-1 I.R.B. 71, at 6.
128. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
129. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1988).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1978).
131. Id § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
132. E.g., I.R.C. § 83(a), 403(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989); id § 1.83-3(e)
(1985).
133. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 403(c) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-2(d)
(1989); 1.83-3(e) (1985).
134. Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56, at 68.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
136. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
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C. Results
Income tax is imposed upon beneficiaries at the earlier of the time
when benefits are received or made available. 137 Social Security tax is
another issue. Employees who receive 1993 compensation at least equal
to the contribution and benefit base would not pay more Social Security
tax if they received additional compensation in that year.'13  If the addi-
tional compensation is deferred under a Rabbi trust, then Social Security
tax is imposed in the year when there is a taxable receipt by the
employee.
139
If payments from a Rabbi trust are received after retirement, Social
Security tax would be due from the employer as well as the employee
each time there is a payment from the trust.14n The amount of tax would
depend upon the contribution and benefit base14' as well as the tax
rates 42 in effect at the time of payment.
Most plans are set up so that there will be no taxable receipt of income
before actual payment. While many individuals favor postponing tax
payments, it is uncertain whether savings occur as the result of such post-
ponement. For example, if the postponement results in the imposition of
a Social Security tax obligation where none would have been due, the
benefit of deferral will be diminished. 43
Income tax burdens must be evaluated. The federal, state, and local
burden on additional current compensation will have to be compared to
the probable burdens in one or more subsequent years. The process is
137. Tfreas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1978).
138. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b) (1988), 3121(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992), 3121(x); 42
U.S.C. § 430 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). For 1993, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) contribution and benefit base is $57,600, while the Hospital Insurance
base is $135,000. Social Security Admin., Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,619 (Oct. 27, 1992). The
1993 Act removed the hospital ceiling for compensation received after 1993. I.R.C.
§ 3121(a)(1). The 1994 OASDI base will be $60,600. Social Security Admin., Notice, 58
Fed. Reg. 58,004 (Oct. 28, 1993).
139. I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(A) (1988). See generally Kent A. Mason, Application of the
FICA Tax to Deferred Compensation Plans, 50 N.Y.U. TAx INST. (ERISA Supp.) Ch. 2
(1992).
140. I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b), 3121(v)(2)(A).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
142. 141. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b).
143. Id. § 3121(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991).
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complicated by the unpredictable fluctuations in tax rates,' 4 and by the
equally uncertain time value of money.145
The employer cannot deduct for contributions to the plan, or for his
share of Social Security tax on those contributions, until the beneficiary is
taxed.' 46 Since contributions are treated as if they were paid by the em-
ployer, 47 the amount of the deduction is the lesser of the amount re-
ceived by the beneficiary or the amount contributed by the employer.'
48
Because the amount is not limited by the value of the beneficiary's inter-
est, there is no requirement of keeping separate accounts for each
participant. 49
Earnings of assets held by Rabbi trusts and custodial funds are taxable
to the employer.'50 The burden of paying tax on earnings before a salary
deduction is available can be avoided if the assets do not produce cur-
rently taxable income. That result can be achieved with tax-exempt
bonds, 51 or assets without current earnings such as stocks that do not pay
dividends.' 52
D. Rulings
An advance ruling from IRS on the treatment of a Rabbi trust is not
required. If the transaction is adequate to avoid funding and defers re-
ceipt of income to the participant, the goal has been achieved. Many of
the issues are subjective, however, and most individuals prefer to deal
with them in advance.
A request for an advance ruling should raise two issues for considera-
tion. A ruling on the status of the trust is concerned primarily with
whether the trust is funded. The IRS will not issue an advance ruling on a
144. For example, President Clinton proposed a new 36% income tax rate. Staff of
Joint Comm. on Tax., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA), Bull. #19
at 4 (May 6, 1993). The 1993 Act added new 36% and 39.6% rates. E.g., I.R.C. § 1(a)(2)
(1993).
145. 2 BrrrnER & LocxEN, supra note 55, at 56-5 to -7. Comparing tax burdens may
be unnecessary. If the reason for the deferral of income is to purchase employee loyalty,
the employer will not be willing to pay the additional sum as current compensation. The
limit of its cooperation will be arranging the plan so that the tax is postponed until actual
payment can be obtained from the plan.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12(b)(1) (1978).
147. Id. § 1.404(a)-12(b)(2).
148. Id. § 1.404(a)-12(b)(1).
149. Id. § 1.404(a)-12(b)(3).
150. Id. § 1.671-3(a)(1) (1969), 1.61-13(b) (1957); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-18-022 (Feb. 5,
1988).
151. I.R.C. § 103 (1988).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1978).
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Rabbi trust unless it complies with the model trust requirements. 5 3 The
second issue is whether the plan is adequate to defer the receipt of in-
come. Receipt is deferred if the plan does not provide actual or construc-





The timing of compensation income has never been entirely certain.
The 1913 Revenue Act declared that compensation was gross income re-
gardless of the form of payment.155 Corresponding regulations concluded
that fair market value was the amount to be reported if property was
received.'5 6 It was generally assumed that all individuals used the cash
method of accounting, and that no need existed for records of their rela-
tively simple affairs." 7
People immediately began using the cash method to postpone report-
ing by failing to take immediate possession of their income. 58 The dodge
was discovered almost as soon as it began, and the actual possession re-
quirement was modified with a constructive receipt rule.15 9 This rule
mandated that if the only thing between an individual and actual receipt
of income was a failure to take possession, it would be treated as if the
individual were in actual possession. 60 Constructive receipt occurred at
the earliest time when there was an adequate right of possession.' 6 '
While the constructive receipt rule dealt with cases such as uncashed
checks and interest left in bank accounts,162 it did not apply to noncash
benefits, like interest in trusts and insurance protection. 63 The 1918 reg-
153. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
154. E.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-1 C.B. 428.
155. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16 § II(B), 38 Stat. 167.
156. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4(a) (1914), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE Acts 1909-1950
(Bernard D. Reams, Jr., ed., 1979) [hereinafter U.S. REVENUE AcTS].
157. See War Income Tax, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1001, 40 Stat. 325 (1917).
158. See 4 BrrrrcER & LOKKFN, supra note 55, at 105-52.




162. E.g., 4 BrrrrcR & LoKKEN, supra note 55, at 105-52 (stating that the constructive
receipt doctrine prevented taxpayer manipulation of the progressive tax rate structure by
taxing uncashed checks and interest when constructively received).
163. Compare Dupree v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 113 (1942) with Brodie v. Commis-
sioner, 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
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ulations introduced an economic benefit rule.164 Benefits such as em-
ployer-provided health and life coverage were gross income even though
the employees might never receive any cash from the transaction. 65 The
amount was equal to the premium paid by the employer, and it was re-
ceived on the first day that the premium provided coverage. 66
Notes and other evidences of indebtedness were another sort of eco-
nomic benefit, and the IRS thought this category included interests in
pension and profit-sharing trusts. 67 When it appeared that efforts to dis-
suade the IRS from pursuing this line of reasoning were not likely to
succeed, people decided to seek legislation exempting interests in pension
and profit-sharing trusts from the constructive receipt rule. 68 Treasury
agreed to cooperate and presented the proposal to Congress during hear-
ings on the 1921 bill.169
Concern about the timing of income from pension and profit-sharing
plans was resolved by a statutory timing rule for participants and their
beneficiaries. 170 Plans that qualified under the rule were not taxable until
the earlier of the time a payment was received, or the time when they had
a right to receive payment from the trust.171 Interest in nonqualified
plans remained low until restrictions began to increase the cost of
qualification.
The first substantial restriction was enacted in 1942.172 In order to em-
phasize the consequences of failure to satisfy the restriction, the changes
included a timing rule for nonqualified trusts.'73 Under this rule, a par-
ticipant received compensation when a contribution was made, if his in-
terest was vested. 74 If the interest was not vested when the contribution
was made, there was no tax until payment was received from the trust.175
164. Treas. Reg. 45 (prel. ed), art. 32 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REvENuE Acre,
supra note 156; Treas. Reg. 45, art. 33 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REvENuE Acre, supra
note 156. Prior to the regulation, IRS was unable to make up its mind. E.g., L.O. 1014, 2
C.B. 88 (1920), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 308.
165. L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920).
166. Id.
167. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 34 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REvENUE Acrs, supra note
156; O.D. 791, 4 C.B. 76 (1921), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-31,
1969-1 C.B. 307.
168. Revenue Act of 1921: Finance Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 312,312 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Economist and
Tax Advisor, Treas. Dep't), reprinted in 95A U.S. REwvnNu Acts, supra note 156.
169. Id.
170. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247.
171. Id.
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The treatment of contributions to nonvested interests was changed in
1969.176 The new rule imposed tax on the value of the interest when vest-
ing occurred.177
B. Economic Benefit
1. Notes and Other Promises
Payments of cash or tangible property normally are considered income
when received,17 while intangible property is less likely to be considered
income at that time.179 Receipt of a promise is income if it is considered
to be the equivalent of cash.180 A promise is equivalent to cash if it is
likely that the recipient eventually will receive cash or property.181 On
the other hand, if substantial doubt exists concerning eventual collection,
the promise is not the equivalent of cash."8 2
Application of the constructive receipt theory to specific situations de-
veloped in stages. The 1913 regulations called for inclusion in income of
the fair market value of noncash receipts but did not suggest a concrete
example involving receipt of a promise. 183 The 1916 regulations applied
the rule by imposing tax on compensation paid in corporate stock.
184
Employers avoided the new rule by changing the form of their transac-
tions. Instead of paying in stock, they conveyed options which gave their
employees the right to make bargain purchases of stock.18 5 There was no
response until 1923, when Treasury announced that income would be re-
alized when an option was exercised. 86 The taxable income from the
transaction equalled the difference between the fair market value of the
stock acquired and the amount paid by the employee upon exercise.
8 7
The treatment of employer-supplied insurance was a related issue. Ini-
tially, the government considered recoveries on accident, health, and life
176. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321, 83 Stat. 588-91.
177. Id.
178. 4 BMrER & LOKKEN, supra note 55, at 105-49; GERTZMAN, supra note 53, at 3-
16.




183. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 4(a) (1914), reprinted in 132 U.S. REvENUE Acrs, supra note
156.
184. Treas. Reg. § 33 (rev.), art. 139 (1918), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra
note 156.
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insurance policies taxable."a A questionable 1924 Supreme Court deci-
sion concluded that life insurance recoveries were not taxable,18 9 and a
threat of legislation led to the 1918 withdrawal of regulations asserting
the tax on accident and health recoveries.190
Withdrawal of the tax on recoveries from accident and health insurance
policies caused Treasury to look for another approach. The preliminary
edition of the 1918 regulations imposed tax on the value of employer sup-
plied accident and health coverage, which was measured by the premiums
paid by the employer.191 Treasury realized that the theory would be
equally applicable to life insurance and notes received in payment of
compensation, and those transactions were added to the next version of
the 1918 regulations."9
In 1921, an undocumented occurrence caused Treasury to reverse the
1918 approach to most types of insurance coverage.193 The regulations
concluded that group life premiums were not taxable, but they did not
mention health and accident coverage.' 94 This omission led to the as-
sumption through the early fifties that there was no tax on employer-
supplied accident and health coverage. 195 One can only speculate about
why Treasury voluntarily withdrew from the field of battle.
A 1921 ruling announced a campaign to enforce the rule for notes.'96
The IRS concluded that vested interests in pension and profit-sharing
plans were taxable when employers contributed to the plans."9 Con-
cerned by the prospect of tax liability without having cash to pay, people
188. Treas. Reg. 33 (rev.), 25 (1918), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE Acts, supra note
156; T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
189. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924) (holding that
life insurance recoveries were not included in gross income).
190. Compare Treas. Reg. § 33 (rev.), art. 4, 25 (1918), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE
Acts, supra note 156 with T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) and H.R. REP.
No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 86, 92.
191. Teas. Reg. 45 (prel. ed.), art. 32 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE AcTs,
supra note 156.
192. Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 33-34 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra note
156. Compare L.O. 528 (1917) with L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920), declared obsolete without
replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
193. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 33 (1921), reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE Acts, supra note
156; see L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-
31, 1969-1 C.B. 308.
194. L.O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88 (1920), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 69-
31, 1969-1 C.B. 308.
195. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. (Oct. 26, 1943), reprinted in 1943 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep.
(CCH) 6587.
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promptly obtained legislation postponing the tax until payment was re-
ceived or made available.' 98
Retirement annuities were the subject of a 1923 ruling.'99 Employers
paid a single premium for annuity bonds, which were immediately deliv-
ered to employees. 2" Ownership did not depend on continuation of em-
ployment. One type of annuity denied recovery if the annuitant died
before a stated age,20' while another guaranteed some recovery regard-
less of the date of death.2° Since the bonds were not assignable and did
not make an unconditional promise, the IRS found that their value was
not readily realizable, and concluded that there was no income to em-
ployees when the bonds were received.2"3
Two astounding rulings were issued in 1935.2 4 People generally had
been satisfied with the 1923 ruling on annuities until the early thirties
when the Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association (TIAA) decided
there might be a problem. After discussion with representatives of the
TIAA,20 5 the IRS ruled that participants in an annuity plan did not re-
ceive income when a school paid their retirement annuity premiums.
Since there was no discussion of the circumstances, the result did not de-
pend on matters such as vesting or marketability. 0 6 The TIAA's success
encouraged other members of the insurance industry to seek rulings, and
another 1935 ruling reached the same result without identifying the type
of employer.20 7
198. Rev. Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(0, 42 Stat. 247 (1921).




203. Id. at 71.
204. I.T. 2874, XIV-1 C.B. 49 (1935), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul.
67-467, 1967-2 C.B. 432; I.T. 2891, XIV-1 C.B. 50 (1935), revoked, I.T. 4041, 1951-1 C.B. 5.
205. Technical Amendments to Internal Revenue Code: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1956) (statement of John
Paul Good, TIAA Secretary), reprinted in 12 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra note 156.
206. I.T. 2874, XIV-1 C.B. 49 (1935), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul.
67-467, 1967-2 C.B. 432.
207. I.T. 2891, XIV-1 C.B. 50 (1935), revoked, I.T. 4041, 1951-1 C.B. 5. A third as-
tounding ruling involved the deductibility of premiums. Even though past service contri-
butions to a pension trust had to be amortized, past service premiums for a retirement
annuity were deductible in full in the year of payment. Compare Revenue Act of 1928,
§ 23(q), Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 802 (allowing a deduction of an employer's payments
to pension funds only if the deduction was equally distributed over 10 consecutive years)
with I.T. 2910, XIV-2 C.B. 152 (1935) (allowing employers to deduct premium payments
on past service annuities in full in the year of payment), declared obsolete without replace-
ment, Rev. Rul. 70-278, 1970-1 C.B. 281.
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IRS dug in its heels when attention was directed to the inconsistent
treatment of insurance premiums.20 8 Exclusion was upheld for employer
payments to acquire retirement annuities and group life coverage, while
premiums on individual life policies remained taxable to the employee.20 9
The fact that the courts had no trouble taxing premiums on individual
policies where the benefits were indistinguishable from typical group ar-
rangements did not appear to bother the IRS.210
The IRS still had not come to grips with the disparate treatment of
notes and other promises when the Ways and Means Committee held
hearings on the 1942 revenue bill.211 Several witnesses at these hearings
pointed out that if proposed restrictions2 12 on pension trusts were en-
acted, similar rules for retirement annuities would be necessary.213  The
Ways and Means Committee agreed, and conforming rules became part
of the statute.21 4
Treasury and the IRS apparently preferred the uncertainty that contin-
ued to surround the treatment of most fringe benefits. When a congres-
sional committee investigated President Nixon's tax returns in 1974, it
found its work to be complicated by the lack of official policy on the
general issue.21 5 The ensuing scandal caused by publication of the com-
mittee's report forced authorities to begin trying to formulate an ade-
quate response to the problem.216 Twenty years later, there remains
considerable doubt about the results.
217
208. G.C.M. 16069, XV-1 C.B. 84 (1936), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev.
Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
209. Id.
210. Compare id. with Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934) (holding
that premiums paid by an employer on a life insurance policy are taxable).
211. Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942), reprinted in 33 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 156.
212. Id. at 87 (statement of Randolph E. Paul, Thx Advisor to the Secretary of the
Treasury), reprinted in 33 U.S. REmNU Acts, supra note 156.
213. E.g., id. at 2387-88 (statement of Denis B. Maduro, counsel for the Law and Legis.
Comm., Nat'l Assoc. of Life Underwriters).
214. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-752, § 162(c), 56 Stat. 866 (1942); H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 413, 450-52.
215. Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, Examination of President
Nixon's Tax Returns for 1969 through 1972, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 157-64 (1974).
216. Treas. Dep't, Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations on Employee Fringe Ben-
efits, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975), withdrawn 41 Fed. Reg. 5634 (1976). See generally Note,
Federal Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1976) (ar-
guing that proposed regulations would result in inequitable taxation and suggesting alter-
native regulations).
217. Wendy G. Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of Historical
Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 425 (1984) (discussing various attempts to tax employee
fringe benefits and concluding that the Tax Reform Act of 1984 unjustifiably erodes the tax
base).
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2. Nonqualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Trusts
An interest in a trust is a promise that may be the equivalent of cash.218
Many pension and profit sharing plans agree to make payments from the
assets of a trust, and delivery of an agreement constitutes transfer of an
interest in the trust to the participant.219 There is an additional transfer
each time the employer makes a contribution to the employee's trust
account.220
Since there were no special rules for deferred compensation plans in
the beginning, the general rules governing compensation applied. Hence,
employers could take a deduction for contributions to pension and profit-
sharing trusts,221 trusts were taxed on their earnings,222 and participants
frequently had to pay tax before cash benefits were received. A 1921
ruling concluded that participants were taxed when employer contribu-
tions were received by the plan if the participant had a vested interest.223
Outraged by the treatment of trusts and participants, business leaders
approached Treasury, which agreed to present the problem to Congress
during hearings on the 1921 revenue bill. Congress found that the trusts
should be exempt from taxation, and that benefits should not be tax-
able until the earlier of actual receipt or the time receipt was made
available.224
The timing result was available only if the plan satisfied the terms of
the statute, which required that the assets be held by a trust and that the
plan be for all or some of the employees.2"' Although an early ruling
under the statute seemed to announce the beginning of an antidiscrim-
218. I.R.C. § 402(b) (Supp. IV 1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1985).
219. I.R.C. § 402(b).
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1(a) (1978).
221. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 120 (1914), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE ACrs, supra note
156; O.D. 110, 1 C.B. 224 (1919), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev. Rul. 68-575,
1968-2 C.B. 603.
222. Sears, Roebuck & Co. Employee's Say. and Profits Sharing Pension Fund v. Com-
missioner, 17 B.T.A. 22 (1929), rev'd, 45 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1930); A.A.R. 477, 4 C.B. 264
(1921).
223. Treas. Reg. 33 (rev.), art. 4, 49 (1918) reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE Acrs,
supra note 156; O.D. 791, 4 C.B. 76 (1921), declared obsolete with replacement, Rev. Rul.
69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
224. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247; Internal Revenue:
Finance Comm. Hearings, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-3 (1921) (statement of Dr. S. Adams,
Tax Advisor, Treas. Dept.), reprinted in 95A U.S. REvENup Acrs, supra note 156; H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1921), reprinted in 1939-I (pt.2) C.B. 218.
225. Rev. Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247.
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ination program," 6 the ruling was never enforced.227 In fact, the IRS
encouraged discrimination by issuing favorable letter rulings to discrimi-
natory plans during the twenties and thirties.2" There was little interest
in nonqualified plans during this period since qualification under the stat-
ute was easy and the results were clear.
Circumstances changed when the United States entered World War II.
Income tax rates in excess of ninety percent sent highly compensated
people looking for ways to shelter their income while at the same time, a
discrimination limit was placed on qualified plans.229 In order to empha-
size the difference between qualified and nonqualified plans, the statute
included a description of the treatment of beneficiaries of nonqualified
plans.230
Participants could receive taxable income at three points in time. 3
The first was upon initial receipt of an interest if it was vested at that
time. 32 The second was each time a contribution was made for the par-
ticipant if his interest was vested. 33 Contributions before an interest
vested were not taxed until cash benefits were made available. The third
time was changed from availability to vesting in 1969.3
C. Constructive Receipt
The general rule under the cash method is that income is received
when it is reduced to possession. Early attempts to postpone reporting by
failing to take possession led to inclusion of a constructive receipt rule in
the 1913 regulations.3 5 Under these regulations income was deemed
constructively received if the owner could draw on it at any time, unless
there was a substantial restriction on his right to possession.3 6 The con-
226. S. 965, reprinted in 1 C.B. 224 (1919), declared obsolete without replacement, Rev.
Rul. 68-575, 1968-2 C.B. 603.
227. Albert Handy, Private Pension Plans and the Federal Revenue Act, 16 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 408, 413-14 (1939).
228. Randolph E. Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937,5 U. Ciij. L. Rnv
41, 79 (1937); Harry J. Rudick, Income Taxes and Deferred Compensation Agreements, in
1948 So. CALuF. TAX INST. 163-64.
229. Revenue Act of 1942, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 862.
230. Id., 56 Stat. at 866; Rudick, supra note 228, at 163.64.
231. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1988).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1(a) (1978).
233. Id. Contributions made when the participant's interest was not vested were not
taxed until cash benefits were paid or made available. I.R.C. § 165(c) (1942).
234. I.R.C. § 402(b) (1969).
235. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 67 (1914), reprinted in 132 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra note
156.
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
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structive receipt doctrine led individuals to seek alternative mechanisms
for deferral of income.
The path to deferral was illuminated by two decisions rendered on dif-
ferent phases of a single transaction. The first decision involved a share
of 1940 profits payable to an employee in 1941. Before the end of 1940,
the parties entered into a new employment contract which deferred the
1941 payments until 1942.3 Since the change was an arm's length busi-
ness agreement, the Tax Court concluded that there was no constructive
receipt of income in 1941.3 The IRS promptly announced agreement
with the decision." 9 The second decision, rendered two years later, con-
cerned the payments that had been deferred from 1941 to 1942, which
were delayed to 1943 by a new employment contract made in 1941." °
Because there had never been a time when the employee had a right to
possession of the money, the Tax Court again held that there was no con-
structive receipt.241
There are several lists of restrictions that will avoid constructive receipt
of income. Individuals seeking a letter should comply with conditions for
a favorable advance ruling on a plan accompanying a Rabbi trust.242 The
IRS frequently asks for things not required by law as conditions for an
advance ruling.24 3 Those conditions are not binding on the courts.2'
Planning for a Rabbi trust can be difficult. Since the issues are fac-
tual,24' there is no guarantee that a transaction will not end up in court.
237. Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 4. The change was
profitable to both parties since the employer wanted use of the money for an extra year,
and the employee received interest payments for the extra year.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Veit v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 49,253, at 811 (1949).
241. Veit, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) at 811. The existence of a restriction on the right to posses-
sion sufficient to avoid the constructive receipt of income is a question of fact, and each
case is being decided on its own circumstances unless the issue is foreclosed by administra-
tive action. Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 822 (1991).
242. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422; Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698, amplified,
Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428. Other lists may be helpful during negotiations about
letter rulings or in other dealings with IRS. The only organized presentation of the De-
partment of Treasury and IRS approach is in the substantial risk of forfeiture regulations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1985). The rulings on constructive receipt from qualified plans, for
example, Blyler v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 878 at 884 (1977), Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B.
42, Rev. Rul. 60-292, 1960-2 C.B. 153, and constructive receipt in general, for example,
Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, may also be useful.
243. E.g., BORIS I. BrrrKER & JAMES S. EusTiCc, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATnON OF
CORPORA'nONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (5th ed. 1987).
244. The Tax Court recently rejected an attempt to use the advance ruling guidelines as
a legal requirement. Compare Martin, 96 T.C. at 814 with Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B.
698, amplified, Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
245. Martin, 96 T.C. at 822.
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To avoid such uncertainty, the first step in designing a transaction is to
take maximum advantage of published guidelines and letter rulings.24
The next step is to consider obtaining a letter ruling for a particular
plan.247 Many practitioners think that the uncertainty inherent in a
Rabbi trust makes a letter indispensable.
D. Rulings
The IRS has never published a policy for issuing rulings on nonquali-
fled plans. Since qualification was inexpensive during the twenties and
thirties, interest in nonqualified plans was low and the IRS routinely is-
sued favorable letters3m Introduction of a discrimination limit for quali-
fied plans249 and tax rates in excess of ninety percent sent highly
compensated individuals looking for shelters during the forties. With no
indication of its reasoning, the IRS halted the issuance of private letter
rulings in 1948.2 0 Practitioners received the impression that the IRS: (1)
was reconsidering its overall policy;-, (2) planned to issue published rul-
ings; 2 and (3) did not like dealing with the marginal cases."
Two court decisions" 4 directed attention to some of the possibilities for
nonqualified plans, and a growing interest in the matter led to discussion
of the problems at professional meetings and to the publication of law
review articles. 5 Unmoved by all of the activity, the IRS continued to
246. While letters are not authority, they are admissible evidence of administrative
practice. Rowan v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 (1981).
247. Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1993-1 I.R.B.; Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698, amplified, Rev.
Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428; Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
248. Paul, supra note 228, at 79; Rudick, supra note 228, at 164.
249. I.R.C. § 165(a)(3)-(4) (1946).
250. Rudick, supra note 228.
251. Id.
252. Richard F. Barrett, Current Developments in the Deferred Compensation Mystery,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIvERsrrY ELEVEENv ANNUAL INsTrrTUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 133, 136 (Henry Sellin ed., 1953).
253. Clement J. Clarke, Jr., Deferred Compensation Contracts for Services, in PRO-
CEEDINoS OF NEW YORK UNrvERSrrY DECENNIAL INSTrUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 151,
158 (Henry Sellin ed., 1952).
254. Veit v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 49, 253, at 811 (1949); Veit v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 4.
255. See, e.g., John P. Allison, Deferred Compensation of Executives, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TuLAN TAX INnsTrrE 1954, at 105; Kenneth W. Bergen, Income Tax Aspects of
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVER-
srrv SMrEENrH ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 91 (Henry Sellin ed., 1958);
George R. Blodgett, Deferred Compensation of Executives, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YoRK UNtVERsrrY SmXTH ANNUAL INSTITUT ON FEDERAL TAXATION 764 (1948); Leo A.
Diamond, Tax Aspects of Nonqualified Pension and Deferred Payment Plans, 32 TAXES 615
(1954); Louis Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAX L. Rv. 391 (1949);
Harry J. Rudick, Executives' Compensation, in 1955 S. CALIF. TAX INsT. 655; Louis W.
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operate without a published position and refused to consider requests for
letter rulings." 6
Politics finally forced a change. The demand for guidance continued to
increase, and there was a growing possibility of legislation. 5 7 The IRS
decided that the way to provide guidance and to avoid dealing with mar-
ginal cases was to publish a ruling and continue its no letter policy.258 A
1960 ruling was insufficient because it only covered a few clear cases.Z 9
In the end, the ruling may have caused more pressure for the issuance of
letter rulings because it further increased interest in nonqualified plans.
The IRS finally succumbed to the political pressures and started issuing
letter rulings on nonqualified plans in 1964.260
It was a shotgun wedding, and the IRS was not happy. Personnel were
instructed to be conservative in issuing letters in 1964 and 1965 because
the IRS had little experience in dealing with nonqualified plans.261 The
issuance of letters was suspended in 1966 when the IRS became uncom-
fortable with the direction of its rulings and wanted to review its overall
policy.262 After the suspension, no further interruptions occurred until
1977.
Discomfort became acute in early 1977 when the IRS suspended issu-
ance of rulings on nonqualified plans of state and local governments
pending a study of the situation.263 At the conclusion of that study, the
IRS proposed that amounts deferred under all nonqualified plans be cur-
rently taxable.26" The proposal was not expected, and there was a deter-
mined public outcry.
265
Standenmaier, Jr., Federal Income Taxation, Deferred Compensation Agreements and the
Doctrine of Constructive Receipt, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 389 (1959).
256. Robert J. McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L.
REv. 201, 205, 209 (1969).
257. Id. at 209.
258. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
259. Id.
260. Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2 C.B. 121.
261. McDonald, supra note 256, at 220.
262. Id.
263. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6761, 6828.
264. When the inquiry began in April of 1977, it was limited to nonqualified plans of
state and local governments. A September release announced expansion to nonqualified
plans of all employers. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263; Info. Rel. 1881 (Sept. 7, 1977),
reprinted in 6 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 55,856 (1977); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg.
4638 (1978).
265. E.g., Richard W. Skillman, How Would the New Proposed Regs Affect Deferred
Compensation Arrangements?, 48 J. TAX'N 258 (1978) (analyzing the broad effects upon
established treatment of unfunded, nonqualified deferred compensation plans); Michael G.
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There were two legislative reactions.266 First, Congress found that the
limitations imposed by the labor portion of ERISA and the employer's
desire for a current expense deduction were adequate limitations, and
froze the administrative treatment of nonqualified plans of taxable em-
ployers to the situation existing just before the proposal.267 This is as
close as Congress has come to legislative approval of the tax treatment of
nonqualified plans.268
Secondly, Congress thought employees of state and local governments
should be eligible for analogous treatment. Since the ERISA and deduc-
tion restrictions did not apply,2 69 Congress enacted Section 457, which
limited annual deferrals and imposed other restraints. 270
Administrative approaches to the two types of nonqualified plans are
revealing. Treasury and the IRS have applied the liberal principles appli-
cable to qualified plans to nonqualified plans under Section 457.271 At
the same time, the IRS has continued the conservative approach for other
nonqualified plans.2 72
The comfort factor is the only apparent reason for the difference in
treatment. There has been no suggestion of a suspension of letter rulings
under Section 457 since its enactment in 1978. Other nonqualified plans
are a different matter. Even though there was some degree of legislative
approval in 1978, the IRS is still not comfortable in the absence of explicit
legislative approval of a definite program.273
Recent events offer a degree of insight into the current IRS attitude.
In 1984, the General Counsel's office undertook an extensive evaluation
of the treatment of nonqualified plans.274 The issuance of letter rulings
was suspended for periods in 1985 and 1986, while the IRS was reconsid-
ering its position. The IRS resumed its rulings with a carefully considered
Wasserman, Proposed Reg. Sec. 1.61-16: An Example of Administrative Overreaching, 56
TAxes 243 (1978).
266. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 6028-36.
267. Revenue Act of 1978, § 132, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2782.
268. See Sanford A. Klein & William B. Acker, New Laws Provide Needed Guidelines
for Deferred Compensation Arrangements, 50 J. TAx'N 10 (1979).
269. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263.
270. I.R.C. § 457 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
271. Brookes D. Billman & Adele M. Karig, Tax Law, in 1979 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L.
179, 213-14.
272. E.g., Rev. Rul. 89-52, 1989-1 C.B. 110; Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 41.
273. E.g., Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698, amplified, Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B.
428.
274. G.C.M. 39230 (May 7, 1984).
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letter.275 Hence, the IRS does not think the congressional freeze pre-
cluded some modifications to the 1978 administrative position.
The IRS believed that the administrative requirements for letter rulings
might be enforceable in court. The guidelines were argued in a 1991 case
where the participants had never had a right to possession of the benefits.
However, in that case, all of the IRS arguments were rejected by the Tax
Court.276
The Tax Court's decision may have brought the IRS to realize that non-
qualified plans are here to stay. TWo procedures published in 1992 out-
line the steps necessary to obtaining a favorable ruling on nonqualified
plans277 and Rabbi trusts.27 Although there are still a number of re-
quirements that have never been published, the procedures certainly are
a large step in the right direction.
Some uncertainty remains because published and letter rulings are not
always followed. Since changes in IRS ruling are normally retroactive,
people who relied on the 1960 ruling and the 1992 procedures could find
they are no longer in force. Withdrawal of a letter has the same effect.2 79
While people may ultimately prevail on a theory such as detrimental reli-
ance, 280 who wants to depend on something as uncertain as equitable re-
lief? Therefore, conditions other than those set forth by the 1960 ruling
and the 1992 procedures should be used as insurance.2s1
V. ECONOMIC BENEFIT
A. In General
Payments of cash or tangible property usually are income when re-
ceived, while intangibles are less likely to be income at that time. Receipt
of a promise is income if it is considered to be the equivalent of cash. A
promise is equivalent to cash if the recipient probably will receive cash or
275. Robert K. Johnson & C. David Anderson, Executive Compensation Deferred:
Should the Rabbi be Trusted?, in 1989 So. CAulF. TAX INST. 9-1, 9-36. Given that the IRS
continued to test new theories in court, however, it apparently did not think the freeze
precluded some modifications to the existing administrative position. See Billman &
Karig, supra note 271, at 213-14; Klein & Acker, supra note 268, at 10.
276. Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 830 (1991).
277. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
278. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
279. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1988).
280. E.g., Boggs v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1166, 1171 (4th Cir. 1986); Lansons, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 773, 786-87 (1978), affd on retroactive revocation issue, 622 F.2d
774 (5th Cir. 1980).
281. BrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 55, at 105-48 to -50; GERTZMAN, supra note 53, at
3-12 to -16 (1978).
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property sooner or later. On the other hand, if there is substantial doubt
about eventual collection, the promise is not the equivalent of cash.38
There are two categories of promises. A promise is funded if property
has been set aside so it is not subject to the claims of creditors of the
employer.3 If an employer delivers a policy of insurance or an interest
in a trust to an employee, he probably will receive cash at some future
time. Hence, the promise is funded, 4 and the promise is income when
received by the employee if he has an adequate ownership interest.285
A promise to pay is unfunded if the employee must look to assets of
the employer for payment.8 6 Because no separate pool of assets exists to
ensure payment, an unfunded promise is not income when received un-
less it is adequately marketable. Since an employee who receives a mar-
ketable promise probably can obtain cash by disposing of the promise,
promises of this type are income when received by the employee. 
87
B. Funded Promises
Funded promises are considered property.288 Regardless of their clas-
sification under state law,1 9 funded promises are property under the stat-
ute for compensation paid in property.29° An obligation of a third person
to satisfy an employer's promise to pay is a common form of funded
promise.2 91 The third person promise rule usually involves insurance pol-
icies. 292 An employee does not have income if the policy is owned by the
282. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 177-78; Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422; Rev.
Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428. IRS employees tend to be concerned with having a good
track record, and avoid pursuing cases that they may lose. Hence the greater the number
of conditions imposed on actual receipt of income from a nonqualified plan, the more
likely the tax treatment of such a plan will be resolved on favorable terms at an early stage.
283. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) (1985).
284. Daniel S. Knight, Income Tax Consequences of Nonqualified Deferred Compensa-
tion, 21 TAX LAW. 163, 165 (1967).
285. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1 (a)(1) (1978).
286. Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
employee received no economic benefit from the deferred compensation plan because the
employer was the beneficiary of the trust).
287. Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56, at 67-68. "[A] promissory obligation which is
not negotiable within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code," cannot be a cash
equivalent "since such an obligation is not 'freely and easily negotiable so that it passes
from hand to hand in commerce."' Id. (quoting Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465
(1951)).
288. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1988).
289. See, e.g., Note, Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56 COLUM. L.
Rev. 251, 263-65 (1956) (discussing treatment of pension plans under state law).
290. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1985).
291. Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 247 (1951), affd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.
1952).
292. E.g., I.R.C. § 83(a), (c).
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employer who promises a benefit to the employee, because the asset is
still subject to claims of creditors of the employer.293 Claims cease to be
a factor when the employer transfers the policy to the employee. The
employee will be deemed to receive income from the insurance policy at
the time of transfer.
294
The scope of the third person promise rule is unclear. In general, it
applies to situations where the employer creates a fund by paying premi-
ums for a benefit that has been transferred to the employee.295 The un-
certainty created by the general rule is illustrated in a situation where an
employer pays premiums on a policy that guarantees that the employee
will receive benefits promised by a Rabbi trust. Shortly after a 1984 letter
approved the transaction, the IRS announced suspension of letters pend-
ing review of the issue,296 and no letters have been issued since that time.
On the other hand, letters issued in 1987297 and 1989298 concluded that
benefit guarantees provided by the employer's parent corporation did not
constitute funding.299 When the issue arose in the context of self-employ-
ment, a Tax Court decision went even further. A guarantee of earnings
by a party apparently unrelated to the transaction did not constitute fund-
ing. The IRS has announced agreement with the decision.
300
From the employee's viewpoint, there is no difference between a prom-
ise secured by an insurance carrier and any other guarantor of equal sol-
vency. Results suggest that the question of funding depends on whether
there was a transfer of assets by the employer. The suspension of letter
rulings suggests that the IRS had second thoughts about employer in-
volvement in the 1984 transaction.30 1 Other approved guarantees were
293. See Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193, 194.
294. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 403(c); TIeas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1993). However, the promise
is not funded if the policy was issued by an insurance company that itself is the employer.
E.g., Oates v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), affd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953),
nonacq., 1952-2 C.B. 5, nonacq. withdrawn and acq. substituted, 1960-2 C.B. 5.
295. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-06-012 (Nov. 3, 1983). Compare Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, and cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1084 (1981) with Belsky v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987).
296. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-06-012 (Nov. 3, 1983); Surety Bonds for Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation, 15 TAX MGar. Comp. PLAN. J. 263 (1987).
297. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-41-078 (July 17, 1987).
298. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-06-022 (Nov. 10, 1988).
299. See id. (concluding that because the trust's assets remained subject to claims of the
employer's creditors, payments to the trust would not be considered income to plan
beneficiaries).
300. In that case, the promoter of a boxing match promised to pay a boxer's compensa-
tion at some time in the future, a promise that the Tax Court found was not funded, even
though it was guaranteed. Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 37 (1965), acq., 1970-2
C.B. xxi.
301. See supra text accompanying note 296.
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made by third parties for the purpose of completing arms-length business
deals. The IRS approved these because there was no transfer of assets by
the employers. 0 2
An interest in a trust is another type of funded promise.30 3 A trust can
be defined as a holding of "title to property for the purpose of conserving
or protecting it" for other persons. 3°  Arrangements must be examined
carefully because a trust relationship may be inferred from the circum-
stances.30 5 An attempt to create an express trust will fail if the arrange-
ments are inadequate. One requirement is that the fiduciary must be
given adequate authority to deal with the assets.30 6 Another requirement
is that the trust must be funded.0 7 If assets remain subject to claims of
the employer's creditors, they are not treated as if the employer set them
aside to pay benefits to employees, and a trust has not been created.308 A
beneficiary receives income from the trust when his interest becomes
vested.30 9 An ownership interest is vested if it is either transferrable by
the beneficiary or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.310
Whether particular conditions constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture
depends on the facts and circumstances. 311 A substantial risk may exist
where ownership depends on the performance of future services, non-
302. E.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 37 (1965), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xxi; Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 89-06-022 (Nov. 10, 1988).
303. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1985).
304. Id. § 301.7701-4(a) (1986).
305. For example, suppose an employer sets up a reserve account and makes periodic
contributions to guarantee that money will be available in the future to pay benefits. An
express declaration that the account is not held in trust should ensure a finding that the
parties did not create a trust. E.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 175.
306. Compare Rev. Rul. 76-265,1976-2 C.B. 448 (bank fund held to be an agent and not
a trustee because it did not hold title to the property for the purposes of protecting and
conserving it for beneficiaries) with Rev. Rul. 69-300, 1969-1 C.B. 167 (bank fund held to
be a fiduciary on the ground that it was granted discretionary powers in administration and
management of the property). For example, one private letter ruling involved a bank that
held assets in an account for an employer under a declaration of trust. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
37-018 (June 15, 1990). The bank's investment authority was limited to following the em-
ployer's directions, and the parties agreed that the bank would not be liable for investment
decisions. Id. The IRS found that this arrangement did not give rise to a trust and con-
cluded that the bank did not qualify as a fiduciary, but rather was merely an agent of the
employer. Id.; see also United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1943); Rev. Rul. 76-265, 1976-2 C.B. 448.
307. Rev. Rul. 68-47, 1968-1 C.B. 300.
308. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
309. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-1(a)(1) (1978), 1.402(b)-l(a)(1), 1.402(b)-l(b)(1).
310. Id. §§ 1.83-3(b) (1985), 1.83-3(c)(4).
311. A risk of forfeiture is substantial if the employee's "rights to full enjoyment are
conditioned upon future performance of substantial services." I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (1988).
Legislative history does not suggest standards for determining whether other risks are sub-
stantial enough to prevent vesting. Every ownership interest is presumed to be vested, and
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competition, or the occurrence of a condition related to the purpose of
the transfer.3" 2 Since the employer's state of mind is relevant, an other-
wise adequate condition does not constitute a substantial risk if it seems
unlikely that the employer would insist on enforcement.
313
Illustrations in the regulations provide guidance for various transac-
tions.314 Since the regulations presume that future service and noncom-
petition requirements are insubstantial,315 people have the burden of
proof if they disagree.31 "6 Additional future service factors include the
employer's expectation of substantial future services317 and the em-
ployee's right to decline performing the services without a possibility of
forfeiture.
318
Results in cases where a noncompetition agreement is made prior to
retirement are relatively clear.31 9 Treasury has concluded that where an
employee is required not to compete with his employer for a period of
years and where he would encounter great difficulty reaching a similar
level of success with a new undertaking, a substantial risk of forfeiture
exists.320 The treatment of postretirement noncompetition depends on
application of the factors.
321
The fact or amount of benefits may depend on the relative success of
the employee or the employer. Conditions such as the continued exist-
ence of the employer, an identified increase in the profits of the
employer, continued employment, or an adequate increase in the per-
formance of the employee, typically create a substantial risk of forfei-
ture.322 In contrast, bad boy clauses are not substantial restrictions




Thus, the fact that a benefit will be lost if the participant commits a crime
standards in the regulations are applied to see whether a particular interest may not be
vested. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1), (c)(2) (1985).
312. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See 3 BrrrR & LOKKEN, supra note 55, at 60-36 to -39.
316. Id. Factors used to determine whether an agreement not to compete imposes a
substantial risk include the employer's age, health and skill, the availability of alternative
employment opportunities and the likelihood of the employee obtaining them. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(c)(2).
317. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2).
318. Id.
319. Id. § 1.83-3(c)(4), (c)(5).
320. Id.
321. Id. § 1.83-3(c)(1).
322. Id. § 1.83-3(c)(2).
323. Id.
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or is discharged for cause does not constitute a substantial risk of
forfeiture.3"
Additional guidelines apply when an employee has a significant owner-
ship interest in the employer.3 1 To illustrate, a husband and his wife
owned all the stock of a corporation. Their interests in the company's
retirement plan were vested except for a bad boy clause,3 26 which pro-
vided that if they were discharged for an intentional act that would injure
the company, they would forfeit their interests. 27 The Tax Court ob-
served that the probability of forfeiture was too remote to be considered
a substantial risk, and therefore the interests were vested.3
Some people have tried to burn the candle at both ends, by giving an
appearance of forfeitability to a nonforfeitable interest. One case in-
volved a physician who made an employment contract for current
compensation.3 29 Amendments placed conditions on the right to pay-
ments.3 The Tax Court observed that he began with the absolute right
to all compensation and had no reason to subject it to a risk of forfei-
ture.331 Various terms in the trust instrument provided him with several
ways to avoid any attempt to cause a forfeiture.332 The fact that postre-
tirement services were to be paid at an adequate rate negated any infer-
ence that forfeiture was a penalty for failure to serve.333 The employer
had never asked any retired physician for consulting services, and had no
plan to begin a program to do so, despite a provision in the trust instru-
ment that the benefits from the trust could not be received unless the
physician performed postretirement services.334 Because the physician's
324. Id.
325. 1d § 1.83-3(c)(3). The term "significant" is not defined, and examples given by the
regulations illustrate that the focus of the guidelines is on the ability of the participant to
control the employer. Factors to be considered under the guidelines include: the em-
ployee's relationship to other shareholders and the extent of their control, potential con-
trol; and possible loss of control, the employee's position in the corporation and the extent
to which he is subordinate to other employees; the employee's relationship to the officers
and directors; the person who must approve the employee's discharge; and past enforce-
ment actions by the employer. Id.
326. Ludden v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 826, 827,836 (1977), aff'd, 620 F.2d 700 (9th Cir.
1980).
327. Id. at 836.
328. Id.
329. Richardson v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 621, 622-23 (1975). A few years later, the
contract was amended so that part of the current compensation would be placed in a pen-
sion trust, and benefits from the trust were conditioned upon the physician's performance
of any post-retirement services requested by the employer. Id.
330. Id. at 626. The court offered an extensive analysis of the circumstances.
331. Id.
332. I. at 626-29.
333. IM. at 629.
334. Id. at 630-31.
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employer had no need or desire for future services, the court found that
the future services requirement was not substantial.
335
If an interest in a trust is always vested, a participant is taxed on initial
receipt of interest, and there is an additional tax each time the employer
makes a contribution.336 If the interest did not vest upon initial receipt,
there is no tax before vesting.337 Tax is imposed when vesting occurs, and
there is additional tax each time the employer makes a contribution.338
The foregoing consequences will only apply if an entity is treated as a
trust for tax purposes.339 Where there is no trust, the promise will be
considered unfunded,34 and tax consequences will be governed by the
general rules for timing of income from unfunded promises.34'
C. Unfunded Promises
An unfunded'promise to pay benefits is intangible property that is in-
come when received if payment is made sufficiently available.342 Practi-
cal access to a market for the promise is critical in deciding whether
unfunded promises are income to the beneficiary.
One type of unfunded promise is included in an employment con-
tract.343 Because no market exists for employment contracts, the IRS has
announced that receipt of this type of promise is not income.3 4 The IRS
position presumably will change should a market develop.
345
335. Id.
336. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(1) (1978).
337. Id. § 1.402(b)-1(b)(1).
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-061 (Jan. 23, 1990).
340. Teas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3(e) (1985), 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989).
341. Id.
342. Knight, supra note 284, at 174-78.
343. Id.
344. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-2 C.B. 174 at 7-9; see Knight, supra note 284, at 175-76.
Since IRS's position is different if the item sold was property, cases involving the issue of
the marketability of promises received in that type of transaction are irrelevant to the
characterization of promises included in employment contracts. Warren Jones Co. v. Com-
missioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
345. Even if a market develops for employment contracts, however, various factors
could cause a particular contract to be unmarketable. They include the ability of the
debtor to pay, and whether the promise bears interest and is negotiable or secured. Those
and other variables that could reduce the attractiveness of many contracts to the point that
no one would consider buying them. See, e.g., Western Oakes Bldg. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 365, 376-77 (1968) (holding that because a debtor's promise to pay was
included in restricted savings accounts that were not easily negotiable, they could not be
included as taxable income), nonacq., 1968-2 C.B. 3; McIntosh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1164, 1179 (1967) (holding promissory notes to be unmarketable because they
merely evinced a promise to make future payment and were unsecured); Segel v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1131, 1139 (1965) (holding notes to be unmarketable because the
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The second type of unfunded promise is promises that are not a physi-
cal part of an employment contract. The 1918 regulations announced that
notes and other evidences of indebtedness were income to the extent of
their fair market value if received as payment for services.346 However,
promises were not income if received merely as security for payment.3 47
The language was contained in all editions of the regulations from 1918
until 1932.348 The security clause was deleted from the 1934 version.
349
Since there was no change in the statute and the regulations continued to
require that the promise be received as payment,35 ° the modification did
not appear to alter the substantive rule. Many cases governed by the new
regulations were concerned with whether a promise was received as pay-
ment or merely as evidence of a right to be paid.35'
Cash equivalence is similar to constructive receipt in that both doc-
trines are premised on a reasonable opportunity to obtain payment.
352
Income may be constructively received where there is a right to obtain
actual possession of an item of income,3 53 while a promise may be the
equivalent of cash if it can be converted into money by a disposition.
3 54
One method of conversion is discounting to a financial institution.
3 5 5
Since the controlling factor is the practical ability to obtain payment, a
promise cannot be marketable unless it has a fair market value. 5 6 Even
parties made arrangements that the notes would not be negotiated or used as security),
affd, 370 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966). If these factors were present, an employment contract
could continue to be considered as an unfunded promise despite the existence of a market
for such contracts.
346. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 34 (1919), reprinted in 134 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra note
156.
347. Id.
348. E.g., Treas. Reg. 77, art. 54 (1933), reprinted in 139 U.S. Rnvm'uE Acrs, supra
note 156.
349. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 22(a)-4 (1935) reprinted in 140 U.S. REVENUE Acms, supra note
156.
350. Id.
351. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989); see also, e.g., Segel v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1131, 1139 (1965) (holding that notes received by petitioner were not payments
because the documents merely evinced an agreement as to how and when petitioner's com-
mission should be paid), affd, 370 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966); Kniffen v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 553, 565-66 (1962) (holding that promissory note could not be deemed payment re-
ceived because the parties regarded the note as a substitute for, and not the payment of a
debt), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 5; Dial v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 117 122-23 (1955) (holding that
notes and bonds received by petitioner did not constitute payment because they merely
signified intent to adopt payment plan), acq., 1955-2 C.B. 5.
352. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979) with idL § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989) and id.
§ 1.446-1(a)(3) (1992).
353. leas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979).
354. Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56, at 66-67.
355. Id.
356. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(3) (1992).
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if the promise has substantial value, if that value is sufficiently uncertain
to make it inappropriately speculative, then the promise has no fair mar-
ket value.
357
Third party promises with a fair market value may be income when
received. 58 One issue is whether assets of the employer were used to
create a fund. Where there is a fund, another question is certainty of
payment. Some authorities appear to assume that payment is sufficiently
certain if made by someone other than the employer. 35 9 In comparison,
promises made by the employer with an ascertainable fair market value
are subject to marketability and acceptance as payment rules.360 Most
cases involving promises that are negotiable under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code conclude that such promises are marketable.3 6' However, this
is not always the case. If the promise would be denied ready acceptance
in the market place because, for example, the promise was issued by a
maker of doubtful solvency, then it will not be deemed marketable.362
Promises that fail to satisfy the requirements for negotiability normally
are not marketable. The accepted statement of principle is that nonnego-
tiable promises are marketable if they pass readily through the flow of
commerce.363 Since nonnegotiable notes remain subject to personal de-
357. The classic example is Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), which involved a
promise with an estate tax value exceeding a quarter of a million dollars. The promise
could not be assigned an income tax value because of its speculative character. Id. at 413-
14; see, e.g., Western Oakes Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 376-77 (1968) (rul-
ing that restricted savings accounts were not taxable income because they could not be
freely negotiated), nonacq., 1968-2 C.B. 3; Edelman v. United States, 329 F.2d 950,954 (Ct.
Cl. 1964) (holding that contingent fee agreements could not be freely negotiated, and
therefore had no taxable income value); Marcello v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 168, 180-81
(1964) (deciding that the sale of property had income tax value because property was ex-
changed for negotiable promissory notes), affd in part and remanded in part, 380 F.2d 499
(5th Cir. 1967); Estate of Hurlburt v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1286 (1956) (concluding that a
contract to make future payments had no tax significance because the agreement lacked a
market value), nonacq., 1956-2 C.B. 10.
358. Robert J. McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L.
REv. 201, 216-18 (1969).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. E.g., Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363, 372-73 (1965).
362. Dial v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 117, 123 (1955) (holding notes to be non-taxable on
the ground that they were intended to serve solely as additional security for principle
debts), acq., 1955-2 C.B. 5; Hexter v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 888 (1927) (concluding that
notes issued by a corporation did not have market value because the corporation was insol-
vent), acq., VII-1 C.B. 14 (1928). See generally Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56, at 66-67.
363. Ennis v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 799, 802 (1955), nonacq., 1956-2 C.B. 10; Ennis v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465, 470 (1951).
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fenses of the maker, one article observes that it would be difficult to im-
agine a situation where they could be readily converted into cash.3
Recent decisions have recognized the existence of an established mar-
ket as an alternative to negotiability.365 Obligations are usually marketa-
ble where a solvent obligor has made an unconditional, assignable
promise that is not subject to set-offs. These obligations are frequently
transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially greater
than the generally prevailing premium for the use of money.366 That
statement has been accepted by several subsequent opinions.367
Whether a marketable promise of the employer constitutes payment
depends on the intent of the parties.361 The promise and the contract
governing the underlying transaction may be the best evidence of that
intent.369 Several decisions list a number of factors regarding the intent
of the parties, and conclude that the parties did not accept the notes as
payment.37° Other cases look to the general nature of the documents,37'
while a third class of cases focuses on the debtor's ability to pay.372
Some cases have permitted the introduction of oral evidence concern-
ing the intent of the parties. Such evidence may be offered to demon-
364. Diamond & Cutler, supra note 56, at 67-68.
365. Cowder v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
366. Id. at 24.
367. E.g., Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788,790 (9th Cir. 1975). Crosby
v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 980 (1929), acq., VIII-2 C.B. 12, illustrates the characterization
of a promise to pay. Crosby involved a lawyer who sold an interest in his law firm for a
nonnegotiable note. Id. at 981. The note provided that unpaid installments would be can-
celed in the event of the death of the purchaser or on the occurrence of other contingen-
cies. The court deemed the promise to be unmarketable because the right to receive
payments was subject to such unpredictable conditions. Id. at 982-83; see Hudson v. Com-
missioner, 11 T.C. 1042, 1050-51 (1948) (holding that notes could not be deemed marketa-
ble because they were subject to various restrictions), affd, 183 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), and
affd, 184 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1950).
368. Williams v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1000, 1002 (1957) (holding that the note re-
ceived by the employee was evidence of the indebtedness, rather than payment for his
services), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 8; Dial v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 117, 123 (1955) (concluding
that the issuance of promissory notes to employees did not qualify as payments because the
employer only intended the notes to serve as security for debts owed), acq., 1955-2 C.B. 5.
369. See, e.g., Segel v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M (P-H) 65,221, at 1237, 1246 (1965)
(concluding that the parties did not intend notes to be payment because they agreed that
the notes would not be negotiated or used as security), affd, 370 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966).
370. E.g., McIntosh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67,230, at 1278,1295-96 (1967)
(listing the nonnegotiability of notes as one reason why notes could not be defined as
payments); Dial, 24 T.C. at 123.
371. See, e.g., Kniffen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 553, 565-66 (1962), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 5;
Williams v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1000, 1002 (1957), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 8; Dial, 24 T.C. at
123; Hudson v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1042, 1050-51 (1948), affd, 183 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.),
and affd, 184 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1950).
372. See, e.g., Dial, 24 T.C. at 123-25.
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strate that the debtor was unable to pay,3 73 that the promise was not
marketable,374 that there was an oral agreement not to dispose of the
promise,375 or other factors tending to indicate that the creditor did not
accept the promise as payment.376 Subsequent actions of the parties with
regard to the promise may shed light on their original intent.377
If a marketable promise is accepted as payment, the recipient has gross
income at the time the promise is received.37 If a marketable promise is
accepted as security for a loan, or as evidence of an underlying debt,
there is no gross income at the time the promise is received.379
VI. CONSTRUCrIvE RECEIPT
A. In General
Under the cash method of accounting, income is received when cash or
property is reduced to possession.38 0 Although the general rule calls for
actual possession, an individual is treated as being in possession if he has
an adequate right of possession. A right is adequate if it is not subject to
a substantial restriction.8
Authorities have provided some guidance for determining whether
there is a substantial restriction. 382 Although court decisions follow the
general principal, they are not particularly useful planning tools because
373. McIntosh, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1295-96; Williams, 28 T.C. at 1000.
374. McIntosh, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1295-96; Williams, 28 T.C. at 1000.
375. Segel v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (P-H) 65,221, at 1237, 1246 (1965), affd, 370
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1966); Williams, 28 T.C. at 1000.
376. McIntosh, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1295-96; Kniffen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 553,565-
66 (1962), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 5.
377. For example, consider a situation where after the promise was made, the parties
agreed that the promise would not be sold or used as security for a loan. The person who
accepted the promise as payment would desire to convert it to cash. It would seem un-
likely that he would agree to hold on to the promise and therefore, the agreement itself
tends to prove that the promise was not accepted as payment. See Diamond & Cutler,
supra note 56, at 66-68.
378. Marcello v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 168, 188-91 (1964), affd in part and remanded
in part, 380 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1967).
379. McIntosh, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1295-96.
380. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
381. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979). See generally Patricia A. Metzer, Constructive Re-
ceipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensa-
tion, 29 TAx L. REv. 525, 529-33 (1974). The existence of a substantial restriction is a
question of fact. Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 824 (1991). For examples of con-
structive receipt, see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(b) (1979).
382. E.g., Martin, 96 T.C. at 821-20; Veit v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 49,253, at
811 (1949).
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results are somewhat inconsistent.38 3 They are helpful, however, in deter-
mining whether or not administrative requirements may be upheld.
Policy on rulings for nonqualified plans developed slowly. Available
evidence suggests that there was either no policy or that the policy was
very general prior to 1948 when the IRS suspended issuing private letter
rulings.TM When issuance resumed in 1964, the IRS proceeded slowly
because it had inadequate information .38  Although substantial policy
exists today, much of it has never been published.8 6 Private letter rulings
issued to other individuals may provide some assistance. Although they
may not be cited as precedent,38 they can be used as evidence of admin-
istrative practice.
388
The only reasonably complete published approach to the problem is in
the area of substantial risk of forfeiture regulations.389 While these regu-
lations would never apply to a Rabbi trust,390 they represent an official
statement on an analogous topic. If a substantial risk of forfeiture exists
under a Rabbi trust, one should argue that even the government should
accept it as a substantial restriction sufficient to prevent constructive re-
ceipt treatment.
Published rulings may be more helpful. The Tax Court has concluded
that rulings issued under the pre-1981 version of the statute regulating
treatment of interests in qualified trusts use the same principle as the
constructive receipt regulation.391 Hence, there should be no construc-
tive receipt if the plan satisfies the requirements of those rulings. The
most effective published rulings are those dealing with the issue of con-
structive receipt by holders of interests in nonqualified plans .3  A plan
should be successful if it satisfies the requirements of these rulings. How-
ever, not many such rulings exist and those that do only apply to clear
cases. Therefore, they are usually not very helpful.
1. The 1960 Ruling
The 1960 ruling addressed some circumstances that were adequate to
postpone the receipt of compensation.393 The ruling discussed various
383. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 256, at 211.
384. Rudick, supra note 228, at 164.
385. McDonald, supra note 256, at 220.
386. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-069 (May 5, 1988).
387. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1988).
388. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 (1981).
389. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1985).
390. See generally Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
391. Blyler v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 878, 884-87 (1977).
392. E.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 175.
393. Id.
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administrative rulings and court decisions, and employed five examples to
illustrate application of the rules.394
In the first example, an executive was entitled to a fixed salary plus
additional compensation for each year of service. 39- The additional com-
pensation was credited to a bookkeeping reserve,3 96 and payments would
commence upon the termination of his employment, his becoming a part-
time employee, or his becoming incapacitated. 3 7 The contract provided
that the employer did not hold the reserve in trust. The conclusion that
there was no constructive receipt398 is consistent with theory since the
executive did not have a right to possession prior to actual payment. 99
Because the IRS in effect held that there was no need for other condi-
tions, requirements such as future services or noncompetition are not
necessary for postponement.
In another example, a corporation provided a plan of additional com-
pensation for officers and key employees selected by the board of direc-
tors.40 0 A percentage of the corporation's annual earnings would be
divided among the participants, and held in separate accounts by the em-
ployer.40' Any revenues generated from investing the funds in an ac-
count would be credited to that particular account.4° The contract
provided that the employer did not hold the accounts in trust. 3 The
employer was not liable for payments if the participant competed with
the employer, did not make himself available for consultation, or failed to
retain his interest in the plan and keep it unencumbered. 404 Payments
would begin when the participant reached age sixty and was no longer
employed by the company, or became unable to perform his duties.405
There was no constructive receipt.40 6 Reading examples one and two to-
gether tells us that it does not matter whether deferral is under a single
contract or if it is under a plan covering a large number of employees.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 175.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 175, 178.
399. E.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 821-30 (1991); Veit v. Commissioner, 18
T.C.M. (P-H) 49,243, at 811 (1949).
400. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 175.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 176.
404. Id. at 175-76.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 175-76, 178-79.
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In example three, an author exchanged the exclusive right to publish
his book for a royalty contract.4 °7 On the same day, the author and pub-
lisher executed a second agreement which provided that the publisher
would not pay more than a specified amount under the initial contract in
any given year.' 0s Any excess amount would be retained by the publisher
and would be paid in subsequent years.4°9 The agreement did not require
that the retained amounts be segregated by the publisher in any man-
ner.4' ° There was no constructive receipt.4x"
Example three is not materially different from the first two illustra-
tions. It does add that the ruling can be used to defer self-employment
earnings, and that contracts made on the same day will apparently be
treated as a single agreement.412 Several court decisions have concluded
that there was no constructive receipt where the effect of a series of con-
tracts executed in different years was that the employee never had a right
of possession.413
The fourth example involved a football player who was entitled to a
bonus for signing a contract.414 The money was delivered to a bank
which agreed to act as trustee, and to pay the money to the player over a
period of five years.415 Because the player's interest was vested, he re-
ceived a taxable property interest in the year the trust was created.41 6
The IRS greed is illustrated by example five. A boxer agreed to a fight
on a standard form contract. At the same time, he made arrangements to
defer a substantial portion of the proceeds to subsequent years.417 Defer-




411. Id. at 176, 179.
412. Id.
413. See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 821-30 (1991); Veit v. Commis-
sioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 49,253, at 811 (1949). Timing is an important issue in the area of
constructive receipt. The IRS believes that an agreement to defer income is not effective
unless it was made before the employee earned the income. Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B.
698. In the first example, however, the employee earned the compensation after the ar-
rangements were made whole; in the third example, the author earned his royalties after
the parties signed the contract. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 175-76, 178-79. These
examples illustrate that as long as the employee never had a right of possession, it does not
matter that the agreement to defer was made after the employee earned the income. See,
e.g., Martin, 96 T.C. at 814 (holding that petitioners were not in constructive receipt of plan
benefits upon conversion to a new plan or termination of their employment); Veit, 18
T.C.M. (P-H) at 811.
414. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 76.
415. Id.
416. Id. Thsts and other economic benefits are further considered in separate sections
of this Article. See discussion supra part V.
417. Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 23-25 (1965), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xxi.
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rals were not common in the boxing industry and in this example, deferral
was made at the demand of the boxer.418 The IRS thought the fight was a
joint venture, and found that all of the boxer's share of the proceeds were
income in the year of the fight.4 19
The boxer was Sugar Ray Robinson, and the IRS wanted to score a
knockout. The IRS advanced every argument it could think of, and the
Tax Court dismissed all arguments in summary fashion.4 20 The fact that
the promoter was able and perhaps anxious to pay at an earlier time was
simply not relevant. 21 The contract was not a sham since the parties in-
tended to be governed by it.42  Since Mr. Robinson was a mere un-
secured creditor of the promoter, he had no right to possession of the
money and there was no constructive receipt.
423
The IRS was stunned by the blow, and smelling salts seemed ineffec-
tive. Five years later, the IRS swallowed its pride, announced agreement
with the decision,424 and substituted a new example. 42 A theatrical per-
former agreed to share in the profits and losses from a play.426 No more
than twenty-five percent of any profits were payable to the performer
during the run of the play, with the balance being delivered in subsequent
years. Since partnership profits are considered taxable income to the
partners in the year received by the partnership, the agreement to defer
was irrelevant.427 Example five was a place for trial balloons in cases
involving a lot of money. No apparent justification existed for the at-
tempt to tax Mr. Robinson in the year of the fight. The new example was
based on a medical partnership plan where people had won in the district
court, and an appeal was pending. The IRS position was upheld by the
Supreme Court in 1973.42
2. Elections
The 1960 ruling announced a conservative policy. Deferral would be
permitted if an election to defer related to services that had not been
performed.429 A 1971 procedure extended the policy to advance rul-
418. Id. at 26-27.
419. Id. at 33.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 36.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 35-37.




428. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
429. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
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ings.430 The general rule requires elections to be made before the calen-
dar year when services are performed.431 In the case of elections made at
any other time, payment must be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture
that continues from the time of the election until actual payment is
due.432 For advance ruling purposes, a risk of forfeiture is not substantial
unless two criteria are satisfied.433 First, there must be a definite possibil-
ity that the event could occur, and second, a meaningful effort by the
employee will be required to avoid occurrence of the event.434
An exception exists for new plans and newly eligible employees.435
Elections made within thirty days after the effective date of a new plan
will postpone compensation for services performed after the date of the
election.436 The same rule applies to elections made by newly eligible437
employees if the employee makes the election within thirty days of the
commencement of eligibility.438 Deferral elections usually cannot be re-
voked.439 Revocation is permitted if the employee may not participate in
the plan for the balance of the year.44 Employees may express invest-
ment preferences. 4 1 Although the plan may follow these expressions, it
cannot be required to do so.
442
Payouts to participants must be made at the time and in the manner
specified by the plan." 3 Employers may not have discretion over the
time or manner of payment,4 " and they usually cannot be made before
retirement or other termination of employment.445 Earlier payments will
be accepted in the case of automatic payouts of small amounts446 and
hardship relief.
The right to emergency withdrawals must be limited. An event does
not qualify as an emergency unless it is unforeseeable, 7 beyond the con-





435. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
436. Id.; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-21-063 (Feb. 21, 1984).
437. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-21-063 (Feb. 21, 1984).
438. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-37-085 (June 16, 1986); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 86-02-039 (Oct. 15, 1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-21-063 (Feb. 21, 1984).
439. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
440. Id.
441. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
442. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-34-015 (May 25, 1988).
443. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
444. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-069 (May 5, 1988).
445. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
446. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-061 (Jan. 23, 1990); Treas. Reg. § 1.457-2(h)(4) (1982).
447. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
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trol of the beneficiary, 448 and severe financial hardship would result if
early withdrawal were not permitted." 9 The amount must be limited to
the sum reasonably needed to deal with the emergency.
450
Plans may permit payout elections by participants. The times when
payments may be made cannot be before the earlier of death, retirement,
or employment termination. 51 Payout elections must be made at the
same time as deferral elections.452 Subsequent elections are permitted if
payment is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture from the time of the
election until actual payment is due.453
Consider the differences between letter ruling results and those under
the general rule. Under the general rule, no constructive receipt occurs if
an election to defer was made before the employee had a right to actual
receipt.454 The Tax Court has concluded that elections were effective in a
variety of cases involving several aspects of nonqualified plans, 455 includ-
ing initial elections to set up plans and defer compensation,45 6 and elec-
tions to extend the period of original,457 or modified deferral.458 The IRS
has announced agreement with several of those decisions.
45 9
The Tax Court4 0 and the IRS461 have concluded that the pre-1981 ver-
sion of the statute governing distributions from qualified plans462 used
the same legal standard as the constructive receipt regulation. Rulings
under the statute are indistinguishable from the Tax Court decisions on
nonqualified plans. There is no constructive receipt if an election is made
after the employee performs services, but before the payment due
date.463 Hence, the only inquiry is whether the election was made before




451. Id.; Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698.
452. Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698.
453. Id.
454. See, e.g., Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 4.
455. Oates v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), non acq., 1952-2 C.B. 5, non acq. with-
drawn and acq. substituted, 1960-2 C.B. 6, affd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
456. See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814 (1991); Robinson v. Commissioner,
44 T.C. 20 (1965), acq., 1970-1 C.B. xxi.
457. Veit, 8 T.C. at 809.
458. Martin, 96 T.C. at 818.
459. See 1970-1 C.B. xxi (acquiescing in Robinson, 44 T.C. at 20); 1960-2 C.B. 5; (acqui-
escing in Oates, 18 T.C. at 570); 1947-2 C.B. 4 (acquiescing in Veit, 8 T.C. at 809).
460. Blyler v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 878, 884 (1977).
461. Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 41.
462. I.R.C. § 402(a) (1980).
463. Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 41.
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Both qualified 4" and Section 457 Rabbi plans465 may require the
trustee to follow the investment directions of participants. Since there is
no relevant distinction between the two types of Rabbi trusts, one can
only speculate as to why the IRS uses inconsistent approaches. Perhaps
Section 457 trusts are given favorable treatment because they are ex-
pressly authorized by statute.466
If an irrevocable election was made before a distribution was payable,
and it created a substantial restriction, there would be no constructive
receipt.4 67 A mere deferral creates a substantial restriction if the period
was more than inconsequential.46 s
A profit-sharing plan permitted distributions at the end of fifteen years
of participation if an employee made an irrevocable election.469 An elec-
tion could be made anytime until completion of the fourteenth year of
service.470 If there was no election, the balance in the account would be
distributed on death or other termination of employment.47 The irrevo-
cable election was a substantial restriction.472
Another profit-sharing plan permitted withdrawals at various times, in-
cluding financial necessity if a committee agreed that an adequate reason
justified a withdrawal.473 The requirement that elections be approved by
a committee constituted a substantial restriction.474 Loss of an interest in
the plan would also be considered a substantial restriction.475
A profit-sharing plan permitted employees to withdraw employer con-
tributions made during the last two years.47 6 A withdrawal caused a six
month suspension in participation, which meant that the employee lost
his right to share in employer contributions during that period.4 77 Sus-
pension qualified as a substantial restriction. But if an employee with-
464. Rev. Rul. 89-52, 1989-1 C.B. 110; Rev. Rul. 55-354, 1955-1 C.B. 396.
465. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(1) (1982).
466. Section 457 Rabbi trusts will be discussed in the next part of this Article. I.R.C.
§ 457(a) (1988).
467. Rev. Rul 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 42.
468. Examples of substantial periods include restrictions of ten years, or until retire-
ment, severance of employment, death, or disability. Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 41.




473. Rev. Rul. 55-424, 1955-1 C.B. 42.
474. Id.
475. Rev. Rul. 60-292, 1960-2 C.B. 153. A pension plan permitted participants to with-
draw their contributions plus interest at normal retirement age. Id. Since a withdrawal
would cause a loss of the employee's prior service credits on reemployment, a substantial
restriction existed.
476. Rev. Rul. 58-230, 1958-1 C.B. 204.
477. Id.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
drew part of the money, the balance was deemed to be constructively
received.478 There was no penalty on withdrawing the balance because
the penalty had already been incurred. 79
B. Seeking A Private Letter Ruling
There are three categories of uses for authorities under the general
rule. 8 0 One is deciding whether to seek a private letter ruling.48' Many
individuals believe that an advance ruling is necessary. Others have con-
cluded that they do not want to be governed by the conservative ap-
proach, and prefer to play the audit lottery. Another use is resisting
challenge to the plan. The advance ruling standards have been used as an
auditing guideline, but they are not enforceable. 4 2 Hence, the general
rule should be presented to the auditor and pursued during all phases of a
challenge. The third use is as a negotiating tool. If a plan is fairly close to
the conservative approach, it may be possible to get the IRS to relax the
advance ruling guidelines by pointing to the fact that its requirements are
not the law, and that individuals have obtained favorable court decisions
under similar circumstances.
48 3
VII. GOVERNMENT AND ExEMiPr ORGANIZATION PLANS
A. In General
Rabbi plans usually depend on the general rules governing timing of
compensation income.4" Private letter rulings applied the general rules
to plans of state and local governments until the IRS decided to study
the situation.485 The study led the IRS to propose current taxation of
amounts deferred under nonqualified plans.416 Public outcry over the
proposal led to two legislative responses.487
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. E.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 818 (1991).
481. E.g., Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1993-1 I.R.B. 10.
482. Compare Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698 and Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-32-003 (Apr.
18, 1986) with Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814 (1991).
483. E.g., Martin, 96 T.C. at 818.
484. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
485. When the inquiry began in April 1977, it was limited to nonqualified plans of state
and local governments. A September 1977 release announced expansion to nonqualified
plans of all employers. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 65; Tech. Info. Rel. 1881 (Sept.
7, 1977), reprinted in 6 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 55,856 (1977).
486. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 63-65; Proposed Reg. § 1.61-16 (1978), 43 Fed.
Reg. 4638 (1978).
487. Skillman, supra note 265, at 258.
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The first applied to nonqualified plans of taxable employers.48 8 These
employers were limited by the labor portion of ERISA to excess benefit
or top hat plans, and the desire for an expense deduction at the time of a
contribution.4 9 Congress found the limitations490 sufficient and froze the
general rules to the situation existing just before the proposal.491
Congress believed that employees of state and local governments
should be eligible for analogous treatment.41 Since the ERISA and de-
duction limits did not apply, Congress decided to limit annual deferrals
and impose other restraints.493 The legislative responses were inadequate
because they failed to provide for everyone. Since tax exempt employers
were generally unable to use the rule for government plans494 or the
freeze,495 the proposal was applied to them. 96
The government rule was extended to all exempt employers in 1986. 497
President Reagan thought all employees should be given essentially the
same ability to use constructive receipt rules, and recommended that the
statute be expanded to include them.498 Congress agreed, but it did not
explain why an exemption for churches was enacted in 1988.4 9"
Deferred compensation plans generally are subject to the labor portion
of ERISA. While government plans are automatically excluded from
coverage,500 plans of tax exempt organizations must satisfy the require-
488. Revenue Act of 1978, § 132 (b)(1)(A), Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2782-83.
489. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 71-73. See generally Victor Zonna, Nonquali-
fled Deferred Compensation After the Revenue Act of 1978, COMPENSAnON PLAN. J., Feb.
1979, at 3; John P. Warner, The IRS Freeze on Deferred Compensation Rulings, COmPENSA-
T1ON PLAN. J., Jan. 1978, at 3.
490. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 71-73. See generally Zonna, supra note 489, at
3; Warner, supra note 489, at 3.
491. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 71-73. See generally Zonna, supra note 489, at
3; Warner, supra note 489, at 3.
492. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 65-71.
493. Id.; I.R.C. § 457(a), (d)(1) (1978).
494. I.R.C. § 457(a).
495. Revenue Act of 1978, § 132 (b)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 95-600,92 Stat. 2782-83. Exclu-
sion of most tax-exempt organizations was an oversight. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1800, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 204-05 (1978), reprinted in 1978-3 C.B. 539.
496. Compare Ronald Reagan, The President's Tax Proposals 380 (1985), reprinted in
64 TAx REFORM 1986: A LEGISLArIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986 (Ber-
nard D. Reams, Jr. & Margaret H. McDermott eds., 1987) with H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 700 (1985), reprinted in 1986-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 1, 700.
497. Reagan, supra note 496, at 382.
498. Id. at 379-82. See generally Dan S. Brandenburg, Special Tax Considerations for
Unfunded, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation in Tax-Exempt Associations, 12 J. PEN-
SION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 99 (1986) (reviewing the status of unfunded, nonqualified de-
ferred compensation arrangements prior to the 1986 legislative reforms).
499. H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1988), reprinted in 1988-3
C.B. 645.
500. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1988).
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ments.5 0 1 If the arrangement qualifies as a plan,5 0 2 it must comply with
the participation and other rules,503 or qualify for an exception as either
an excess benefits °4 or a top hat plan. 05
B. Technical Requirements
The plan must be maintained by an eligible employer.506 States and
their political subdivisions qualify as eligible employers,5 7 as do other
tax-exempt organizations,508 with the exception of churches."0 9 The plan
must provide that all income deferred under the plan and all plan assets
and earnings remain the property of the employer. 10 The property must
continue to be subject to claims of the employer's general creditors until
it is made available to a beneficiary."
Participation must be limited to employees and independent contrac-
tors who perform services for the employer.512 Since participation does
not have to be voluntary, all employees can be required to participate as
a condition of employment.513 Participants may be given different op-
tions within the plan, or everyone can be required to accept the same
treatment. 1 4
Deferral of income must be agreed to in advance. 15 Compensation
may be deferred for a particular calendar month only if the employee
executed a deferral agreement before the beginning of the month.51 6
Compensation of new employees may be deferred for the first month if
501. Id. § 1003(a). See generally I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 444; Kurt L.P.
Lawson, Nonqualifted Deferred Compensation Under Section 457 After Tax Reform, 65
TAXEs 635, 642 (1987).
502. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3); Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan. 1988),
amended, No. 85-2639-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2344 (D. Kan. Feb. 23, 1989); DOL Advi-
sory Op. 76-111 (Sept. 28, 1976); DOL Advisory Op. 76-79 (May 25, 1976).
503. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1056 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). A plan that satisfies those
rules does not satisfy Section 457. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 444.
504. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(7) (Supp. III 1991), 1081(a)(9).
505. Id. §§ 1051(2) (1988), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1).
506. I.R.C. § 457(e)(1) (1988).
507. Id. § 457(e)(1)(A).
508. Id. § 457(e)(1)(B).
509. Id. § 457(e)(13) (Supp. IV 1992).
510. Id. § 457(b)(6) (1988).
511. Ieas. Reg. § 1.457-20) (1982).
512. I.R.C. §§ 457(b)(1), (e)(2)-(3).
513. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-43-011 (July 16, 1992).
514. I.R.S. Notice 87-13,1987-1 C.B. 432,44; see I.R.C. § 457(e)(12); e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul.
93-05-003 (Nov. 3, 1992).
515. I.R.C. § 457 (b)(4).
516. Id.
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the employee and employer agree to a deferral before the first day of
employment.5
1 7
Annual deferrals must be limited. The amount usually cannot exceed
the lesser of $7500 or one third of includable compensation.51 8 Includ-
able compensation means the amount of money that must be reported as
current gross income. 19 The regulations take the position that a third of
includable compensation is "generally the equivalent of 25 percent of
gross compensation., 520 Although the twenty-five percent rule is an at-
tempt to simplify accounting for the limit, inclusion of the word "gener-
ally" renders it unreliable unless a private letter ruling approves the use
of the twenty-five percent rule in the particular plan.
The $7500 limit must be reduced by amounts deferred under certain
other plans. If a participant is covered by more than one Section 457 plan
for the year, the $7500 limit under a plan is reduced by the amount de-
ferred under the other plan or plans.52' Amounts deferred on various
other arrangements cause the same result.
5 1
During the last three years before a participant reaches his normal re-
tirement date,523 the plan can increase the limit to the lesser of $15,000 or
the appropriate part of the plan ceiling.524 The appropriate part is the
ceiling under the general rule for the current year plus the unused part of
the ceiling for one or more previous years." s The increased amount is
called "catch up" since it permits deferrals for amounts which were not
used in earlier years.526
Any type of plan is permissible. Hence, it may be an individual ac-
count, or a pension, profit-sharing, excess benefit, or top hat plan.527 The
plan must have adequate distribution rules. The plan usually cannot
make anything available to a participant until the earlier of reaching age
seventy and one-half, separation from service, or facing an unforeseeable
emergency.5' The general rule is modified to the extent that the mini-
mum distribution requirement calls for a different result.
517. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-2(g) (1982).
518. I.R.C. § 457(b)(2); e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-25-022 (Mar. 20, 1992).
519. I.R.C. § 457(e)(5)-(7).
520. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-2(m) eg. (1) (1982).
521. I.R.C. § 457(c)(1).
522. Id. § 457(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
523. Treas. Reg. § 1.457(0(4) (1982).
524. I.R.C. § 457(b)(3) (1988).
525. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-62(0(2) (1982).
526. Id. § 1.457-2(m) egs. (2-3).
527. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432,444. Compensatory time, death benefit, disa-
bility, severance, sick leave, and vacation plan are not deferred compensation plans. I.R.C.
§ 457(e)(11).
528. I.R.C. § 457(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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There are several aspects to the minimum distribution requirement.
Distributions must begin no later than April first of the year after the
employee reaches age seventy and one-half.529 If distributions begin
while the participant is still alive, payments must be adequate to satisfy
distribution regulations.530 The general criterion is that more than two-
thirds will be paid during the life expectancy, 531 and any amount not dis-
tributed to the participant during his life will be distributed at least as
rapidly to his beneficiaries.532
If distributions do not begin before the participant dies, the full amount
due usually must be paid over a period not exceeding fifteen years. If the
beneficiary is the surviving spouse, distributions can be over the spouse's
life expectancy.533 Where distributions are to be made over a period of
more than a year, the amount must be substantially nonincreasing and
payable at least annually.
534
C. Results
There are three categories of tax consequences. Trust income is not
taxed because it is attributed to a tax-exempt employer.535 Compensa-
tion is received at the earlier of the time benefits are paid or made
available.
536
Congress and Treasury have adopted a conservative approach to con-
tributions. Compensation cannot be deferred unless an agreement to de-
fer was made before the services are rendered.537 An amount equal to
the plan limit may be deferred even if the contribution exceeds the plan
limit.538 The statute does not specify how a contribution should be
treated to the extent it exceeds the plan limit.
Regulations take the position that Section 457 is the only ground for
deferral.5 39 One example involved a single plan that permitted a partici-
pant to defer an amount exceeding the limit.5" Another example deals
529. Id. §§ 401(a)(9)(C) (Supp. IV 1992), 457(d)(2)(A).
530. Id. § 457(d)(2)(B)(i)(I).
531. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4663-64.
532. I.R.C. § 457(d)(2)(B)(i)(II).
533. Id. § 457(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
534. Id. § 457(d)(2)(C).
535. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(a)(1) (1969); e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-47-011 (Aug. 21, 1992);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-09-024 (Nov. 30, 1991).
536. I.R.C. § 457(a).
537. Id. § 457(b)(4).
538. Id.
539. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(a) (2-3) (1982).
540. Id. § 1.457-1(b)(2) eg. (5) (1982).
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with deferrals under Section 457 and Section 403(b).541 Deferral under
the Section 457 plan exceeded the limit only if the Section 403(b) contri-
bution was counted.542 Both examples543 found that there was no defer-
ral for the excess amounts. 5 " The result is justified by legislative history
which concludes that Section 457 is the only ground for deferral.
5 45
Excess contributions may cause disqualification of the plan. For exam-
ple, suppose the plan makes an innocent mistake in computing a partici-
pant's limit for a year, or a participant conceals the fact that he was
covered by another plan that would reduce the limit under the plan. The
IRS presumably would not seek to disqualify the plan as long as it ap-
peared that there was a good faith effort to comply with the rules.
In contrast, suppose a significant number of employees under a plan
also work for other employers and the employer makes no effort to de-
termine whether reductions are in order. The IRS could easily find that
excess deferrals were not innocent.546 The penalty for violations can be
disqualification of the plan.547 Government plans are given a period of
over 180 days to cure defects in administration, 514 but there is no grace
period for the plans of other tax-exempt employers. Hence, the IRS
could retroactively disqualify plans of other tax exempt employers for the
entire period of their existence. 49
Results are different if an eligible employer 550 has a plan that does not
satisfy Section 457. Any agreement or other arrangement for deferral is
defined as a plan.55' However, the bad plan rule does not apply to plans
governed by certain other provisions such as Section 401 or Section
403.552
Compensation covered by the bad plan rule is taxed in the first year
when there is no substantial risk of forfeiture.553 Substantial risk of for-
feiture means payment is conditional on future performance of substan-
541. Id. § 1.457-1(b)(2).
542. Id. eg. (6); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-25-037 (Mar. 25,1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-52-026 (Sept.
27, 1991).
543. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) egs. (5-6) (1982).
544. Id.
545. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 69.
546. See Richard H. MacCracken, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans, 7 S. CAtL TAX.
INsr. 637, 637-39 (1955).
547. I.R.C. § 457(b).
548. Id.
549. I.R.C. § 7805(b).
550. IU. § 457(e)(1) (1988), (e)(13) (Supp. IV 1992).
551. Id. § 457(i)(3)(A) (1988).
552. Id. § 457(f)(2).
553. Id. § 457(f)(1)(A).
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tial services. 554 Since the statute and regulations do not offer any
guidance for applying the future services rule, the Section 83 standards
for applying those words is the best starting point.555
The bad plan rule can be useful. Suppose the parties do not want to
use Section 457 because of the dollar limit on contributions, or the distri-
bution requirements. If the employer makes a bad plan that requires sub-
stantial future services before an actual distribution is made available, the
bad plan rule has in effect permitted an eligible employer to set up a
Rabbi plan under the general rule.556
One class of individuals escapes both the limits of Section 457 and the
bad plan rule. This class consists of independent contractors if everyone,
other than those who have not satisfied any initial service requirements,
with the same relationship to the payor is covered under the plan with no
individual variations or options. 557 The treatment of contributions for
members of the class is governed by the general rules for timing of com-
pensation income.'-"
Suppose a tax-exempt hospital knows many of its physicians who are
independent contractors also work at several other hospitals. The hospi-
tal sets up a plan for those physicians, and there are no individual varia-
tions or options. Since Section 457 does not apply, the timing of income
is governed by the general rules.
Various events could be considered distributions. The availability of
investment options does not cause constructive receipt of income. The
result does not change even if an option is exercised after the beginning
of actual distributions.559 A transfer of assets from one Section 457 plan
to another Section 457 plan generally does not cause constructive re-
554. Id. § 457(f)(3)(B).
555. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-36-014 (June 5, 1992). In one case,
a physician made a contract for deferred compensation from a hospital. Richardson v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 621, 623 (1975). The payment of benefits under the contract was
conditioned on performance of post retirement services requested by the employer. Id. at
624. The employer had never asked the retired physician for consulting services, and had
no plans to begin such a program. Id. Since the employer had no need or desire for future
services, the future services requirement was not substantial and the physician was not
faced with a substantial risk of forfeiture Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-36-005 (May 31,
1991).
556. Anthony L. Scialabba, Special Rules Allow Flexible Deferred Comp. Plans for Ex-
empt, Government Employers, 76 J. TAX'N 294, 297 (1992).
557. I.R.C. § 457(e)(12)(B); see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-49-032 (Sept. 10, 1991).
558. I.R.C. § 457(e)(12)(A).
559. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(1) (1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-37-018 (June 12, 1992); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 92-45-010 (July 31, 1992).
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ceipt.560 However, a transfer of assets from a Section 457 plan to any
other sort of plan is a taxable distribution.
561
The treatment of distributions can be divided into two categories. If
the plan satisfies Section 457, deferred amounts are received under the
general rule at the earlier of the time when benefits are paid or made
available.562 The made available language presumably was borrowed
from the pre-1981 rule for distributions from qualified plans,563 and regu-
lations confirm the suspicion that the two statutes use the same construc-
tive receipt criterion.5
Constructive receipt cannot occur until a participant has a right to ac-
tual receipt of benefits.565 Thus, distribution elections can be made any-
time before benefits are payable. If the plan provides that a lump sum
will be paid ninety days after pre-retirement separation from service un-
less deferral is elected within thirty days after separation, then a timely
election will postpone receipt.
566
The right to make emergency withdrawals does not cause constructive
receipt under specified circumstances.567 The right must be limited to ex-
traordinary and unforeseeable circumstances, such as sickness or injury of
the participant or his dependent, or a casualty loss. 568 Withdrawals must
be limited to the amount reasonably needed to deal with the emer-
gency.569 The right to a small lump sum distribution does not cause con-
structive receipt if no additional amounts can be deferred, and the
amount to be distributed does not exceed $3500.570
The other category is the bad plan rule. A second tax may be imposed
under the bad plan rule. Tax is imposed at the earlier of actual dis-
tribution or the time when payment ceases to be subject to a substantial
future service requirement.57' There is no double taxation. The amount
of an actual distribution is reduced by the amount of a constructive
distribution.572
560. I.R.C. § 457(e)(10); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-14-006 (Dec. 28, 1992).
561. Rev. Rul. 86-103, 1986-2 C.B. 62; see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-45-010 (July 31, 1991).
562. I.R.C. § 457(a).
563. E.g., Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 42; Rev. Rul. 55-425, 1955-1 C.B. 43.
564. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) eg. (1)(ii) (1982).
565. Id; reas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) e.g. (4) (1982).
566. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) e.g. (4) (1982).
567. I.R.C. § 457(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1992); Teas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) eg. (3)
(1982).
568. Teas. Reg. § 1.457-2(h)(4) (1982).
569. Id. § 1.457-2(h)(5).
570. I.R.C. § 457(e)(9) (1988). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.457-1(b)(2) eg. (2) (1982) with
Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 445.
571. I.R.C. § 457(f)(1)(A).
572. Id. §§ 457(f)(1)(B), 472(b).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Several factors must be examined in order to decide whether a Rabbi
arrangement is the best choice. If the employer wants to pay additional
compensation, the easy approach is to pay cash. Many employers would
prefer to keep the cash and issue a promise to pay in the future. Golden
handcuffs may be another employer goal. Employers are aware of the
ability to take cash and leave, and most would prefer to make a promise
to pay in the future as a method of retaining employees.573
Some employees do not want more cash because they believe their tax
burden will be reduced if they defer their compensation until after retire-
ment when they anticipate being in a lower tax bracket. If the employer
wants to purchase loyalty, future payments should be subject to condi-
tions such as noncompetition.5 74
Deferral can be accomplished with a qualified plan, which is the best
tax shelter from the viewpoint of most potential participants. The em-
ployer is entitled to an immediate deduction for contributions,5 75 contri-
butions are held in trust for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries, 76 trust
income is not taxed,577 and federal insurance reduces the risk of loss. 78
Beneficiaries are not taxed until there is an actual distribution.579
There are several negative features of the qualified plan. Conditions
such as the participation and coverage rules5 80 make qualified plans the
most expensive sort of deferral mechanism. Amounts that can be made
available to executives may be unsatisfactory because of the limits on
contributions58 1 and benefits, 5 82 and the ability to purchase loyalty is lim-
ited. Some vesting must occur no later than completion of the fifth year
of service,583 and vested benefits cannot be conditioned on factors such as
continued employment or noncompetition.584
573. Richard L. Greene, Compensating the Executive in Cask Payment Now or Payment
Later, 30 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 193,200-25 (1978); Robert K. Johnson & C. David Anderson,
Executive Compensation Deferred: Should the Rabbi Be Trusted?, 41 S. CAL. TAX INST. 9-1,
9-2 to -16 (1989).
574. Greene, supra note 573, at 200-25; Johnson & Anderson, supra note 573, at 9-1 to
9-16.
575. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
576. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
577. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988).
578. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991), 1332(a) (1988).
579. I.R.C. § 402(a) (Supp. IV 1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i) (1991).
580. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 410(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 410(b) (1988).
581. E.g., id. §§ 401(a)(17), 415(c)(1).
582. Id. § 415(b)(1).
583. Id. § 411(a)(2).
584. Id. § 411(a)(1).
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A nonqualified plan with a Rabbi trust may be the best way to provide
additional compensation while simultaneously purchasing executive loy-
alty. While the tax results are less favorable, other factors make them
less expensive than qualified plans. There are no coverage rules, contri-
butions and benefits are unlimited, and interests can remain unvested, or
vesting can be subject to whatever conditions the employer wants to
impose. 85
Labor has been intentionally vague about the requirements necessary
to satisfy the top hat criterion. Labor feels that participation must be
limited to management or highly compensated employees, 586 but has
made no concrete suggestions about what is required to place an individ-
ual in either category. Apparently, Labor will continue to follow the IRS
criterion in determining whether a plan is unfunded. 87 The best way to
deal with the uncertainties is to obtain an advisory opinion. 88
The plan must be adequate to defer compensation under the general
rules for timing of income. The question is whether there will be an ac-
tual or constructive589 receipt of a taxable property interest590 before
benefits are due to be paid. 91
The conservative approach of the IRS has continued to the present
day. A 1992 procedure592 expressly continued the 1971593 procedure with
two modifications of the time when initial elections could be made.
5 94
Several new restrictions were added to the published list. The plan
must state that the parties intended that the plan be unfunded under the
labor portion of ERISA,9 5 that participants are unsecured general
creditors of the employer, 96 and that their interests are not transfer-
rable 5 97 The plan also must identify the time and method for payment of
585. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; Rev. Proc.
92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
586. DOL Advisory Op. 90-14 A (May 8, 1990).
587. At one point Labor flatly stated that a trust that satisfied IRS's requirements for
unfunded status would also be considered unfunded for top hat purposes. Daniel Letter,
supra note 47. Other pronouncements suggest that IRS findings are merely a factor to be
considered. E.g., DOL Advisory Op. 92-13 A (May 19, 1992).
588. ERISA Procedure 76-1, § 10 (Aug. 24, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 36,281, 36,283 (1976).
589. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1978).
590. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1989); id. § 1.83-3 (1985).
591. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
592. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
593. Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698.
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benefits, which may include distributions in the case of an unforeseeable
emergency. 98
Since other limitations have been regularly enforced, the IRS appar-
ently does not intend to include them in the published list. The IRS
sometimes becomes confused about its unpublished requirements. A
1987 letter approved a plan which gave the employer discretion to pay
either a lump sum or in installments. Nine months later, another letter
explained that the original decision was contrary to the longstanding IRS
position.
5 99
Two approaches are available to deal with unpublished requirements.
One is to become familiar with private letter rulings by reading the let-
ters60 0 or by consulting a summary such as a law review article.60 1 The
second approach is to submit a plan for approval knowing that the IRS
may require one or more changes as a condition to a favorable letter.
6 2
The treatment of trusts shows a similar pattern of development. °3 The
IRS compiled a list of requirements for unfunded status and published
some of these in a 1992 model trust procedure.6 4 The effect of the model
trust is not entirely clear. If a trust does not satisfy the terms of the
model, the IRS will probably not issue a favorable letter."05 One issue is
the circumstances under which the IRS would issue a favorable private
letter ruling for a trust that did not satisfy the model. Another is whether
trusts that satisfy the model will always receive a favorable letter. There
is no way of knowing whether all of the requirements were in the model,
or whether new conditions will be imposed at a later time.
The importance of a letter ruling depends on the attitude of the indi-
viduals involved in the transaction. Most revenue agents are conservative
bureaucrats who will automatically approve a plan with a favorable letter
and automatically disapprove the same plan without a letter. People who
are concerned about whether there is a low probability of controversy
598. Id.
599. A 1987 private letter ruling approved a plan that gave the employer discretion to
pay either a lump sum or in installments. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-39-031 (June 29, 1987). Nine
months later, however, another letter explained that the original decision was contrary to
the long standing IRS position. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-069 (May 5, 1988).
600. Several hundred Rabbi letters have been issued since 1981. See, e.g., Johnson &
Anderson, supra note 573, at 9-36, 9-37.
601. E.g., Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1993-1 I.R.B. 10.
602. BrrrXER & Eus-mcE, supra note 243, at 14-17.
603. Compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 31, 1980) with Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2
C.B. 422.
604. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
605. Id.
[Vol. 43:1
Rabbis and Other Top Hats
over the terms and conditions of the plan during an audit presumably will
obtain a letter.
An advance ruling is not required for deferral. 60 6 There is no taxable
property interest if the trust is unfunded, 0 7 beneficiaries usually cannot
market their interests, 60 8 and constructive receipt does not occur until a
beneficiary has a right to possession. 0 9 The additional conditions to an
advance ruling on a trust and plan are not enforceable.
6 10
Some individuals have been successful with the audit lottery. Even
though the additional conditions are not enforceable, they frequently are
used as audit guidelines. Hence, the question is whether the savings from
avoiding the additional conditions seem to offset the aggravation and ex-
pense of a controversy if a plan attracts unfavorable attention during an
audit.
Most employers can set up nonqualified plans with Rabbi trusts under
the general rules.6"1 Congress believed that the limitations of the labor
portion of ERISA and the desire for current deductions for contributions
were adequate restrictions for those plans.6 12 Nonqualified plans of state
and local governments and other tax-exempt employers, 613 except
churches, 14 must comply with Section 457.615
The principal goal of Section 457 is to place dollar limits on tax-free
deferrals. 616 The technical requirements of the statute are reasonably
easy to satisfy. A search of the letter rulings revealed little or no contro-
versy. Most of the requests were from those who may not have looked at
the statute, or who were concerned with unusual situations, such as the
application of the 1986 and 1988 transitional rules. 7
One can only speculate as to why the IRS has been permitted to re-
tain almost absolute discretion to establish conditions necessary for a
favorable private letter ruling. With a few minor exceptions,618 individu-
als who wanted to avoid controversy by arranging their affairs in advance
606. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(6) (1985).
607. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
608. Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985).
609. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
610. Martin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 814, 823 (1991).
611. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428; Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
612. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 71-72.
613. I.R.C. § 457(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
614. Id. § 457(e)(13).
615. The bad plan rule applies to plans which do not comply. Id. § 457(f).
616. S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 263, at 65.
617. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-21-033 (Feb. 21, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-009 (Dec. 4,
1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-49-031 (Sept. 9, 1991).
618. IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 919-21 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1028 (1966).
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have been forced to follow the IRS's requirements. 9 While there is
something to be said for administrative discretion, almost absolute discre-
tion is hard to swallow.
In some areas, the discretion has put the IRS in the position of a legis-
lative body. Where most of the issues are clear, the amount of discretion
is relatively small. In transactions such as reorganizations62 and deferred
compensation plans621 of taxable employers where numerous grey areas
exist, the IRS or individual IRS employees can in effect make law. Be-
cause the courts have been slow to reject administrative actions of the
IRS, legislation is the only way to change the system. There are some
suggestions, however, that Congress wants to continue this sort of infor-
mal legislation.
622
There are a variety of possibilities for deferred compensation plans
under the present system. With adequate planning, the prudent attorney
can establish a plan beneficial to both employer and employee, and sat-
isfy IRS's changing requirements.
619. See, e.g., MacCracken, supra note 546, at 637-39. See generally General Revenue
Revision: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 450-56
(1953) (statement of Theodore Ellenoff, V.P. of Tax-Sheltered Plans Inc.), reprinted in 3
U.S. REVENUE ACmS 1954 (B. Reams ed., 1982); id. at 448 (statements of Paul W. Wilier-
Patterson, pension and profit sharing consultant and Frederick 0. McKenzie, pension and
profit sharing attorney).
620. BrrrKR & EusncE, supra note 243, at 14-17.
621. See, e.g., Johnson & Anderson, supra note 275, at 9-36 to -37. See generally Mac-
Cracken, supra note 546, at 677-79.
622. Congress has approved of creative interpretations of the reorganization rules, see
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 564, and
of the administrative treatment of nonqualified plans as of February 1, 1978. S. REP. No.
1263, supra note 263, at 71-73. See generally Subcomm. on Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. Prevention of Tax Avoidance 8-9, 37-42 (Comm. Print 1933); Acting
Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, Jr., Statement on the Prevention of Tax Avoidance
9-10 (1933), both reprinted in 100 U.S. REvENUE Acrs 1909-50 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed.,
1979).
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